GeminiDuke collects information from the victim, including installed drivers, programs previously executed by users, programs and services configured to automatically run at startup, files and folders present in any user's home folder, files and folders present in any user's My Documents, programs installed to the Program Files folder, and recently accessed files, folders, and programs.6
GeminiDuke collects information on local user accounts from the victim.7
Discovery27 detection rules
Standing S0049
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques629th pct
29th percentile · 71% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics2Bottom 12%
12th percentile · 88% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat group161% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique26med64th pct
64th percentile · 64% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many detection rules per technique or fewer.
Tests / technique9.5med
GeminiDuke detections S0049
157 distinct rules cover the 6 techniques recorded for this malware. 108 Sigma · 49 Splunk.
6 covered by at least one rule157 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 100+ rules
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Detects suspicious user agent strings used in APT malware in proxy logs
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. (...)
This analytic detects the usage of the Utility osascript on a macOS device initiated a network connection lasting longer than 10 minutes (600 seconds). (...)
The following analytic detects the use of known suspicious SSL certificates in any observed event where the SSL_CertFingerprint field is present. (...)
The following analytic detects connections with a high Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) threat confidence score, indicating potentially malicious behavior within encrypted traffic. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. (...)
Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "storage" flag in order to retrieve information about the storage status and other related information. (...)
frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'
2021-12-07
2025-10-18
0e4164da-94bc-450d-a7be-a4b176179f1f
Splunk
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet, which is used to query local user accounts. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` PowerShell commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that utilize the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter to query local user accounts. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). (...)