VOID MANTICORE has dumped LSASS credentials using comsvcs.dll via rundll32.exe.7
During HomeLand Justice, threat actors dumped LSASS memory on compromised hosts.8
group
VOID MANTICORE G1055
- Created
- 20 April 2026
- Last modified
- 31 July 2026
- Aliases
- VOID MANTICORE · COBALT MYSTIQUE · Handala Hack · Homeland Justice · Karma · Karmabelow80 · BANISHED KITTEN · Red Sandstorm
VOID MANTICORE is a threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Active since at least mid-2022, VOID MANTICORE has targeted government entities, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations across Albania, Israel, and the United States.[1][2] VOID MANTICORE conducts destructive cyber operations, combining wiper attacks with hack-and-leak campaigns. The group has operated under multiple public-facing personas, including HomeLand Justice in operations against Albania, Karma and Karma Below in campaigns targeting Israeli organizations, and Handala Hack, its current primary persona, which has claimed activity against Israeli and U.S. entities, including a March 2026 attack against Stryker Corporation.[1][3] VOID MANTICORE has been observed collaborating with Scarred Manticore, which has been linked to initial access operations preceding VOID MANTICORE’s activity.[4]
63
TechniquesTop 10%
15
TacticsTop 1%
0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
1
Campaignunranked
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
MITRE reference G1055
VOID MANTICORE has collected cached data and files from within the victim environment.91011
VOID MANTICORE has used RDP to move laterally within the victim environment.12
During HomeLand Justice, threat actors primarily used RDP for lateral movement in the victim environment.1314
During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used SMB for lateral movement.1516
VOID MANTICORE has compressed their payloads by leveraging zip files.17
VOID MANTICORE has masqueraded as commonly used programs and services on Windows hosts.18
Standing G1055
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this group touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 176 ATT&CK groups only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques63Top 10%
90th percentile · 90% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics15Top 1%
100th percentile · None of the 176 ATT&CK groups has more tactics spanned — the highest in the population.
Tools & malware0Bottom 9%
9th percentile · 91% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tools and malware.
Campaign189% tie · 4 values
89% of the population shares a single value across only 4 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique14med41st pct
41st percentile · 59% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique1med
Detection coverage G1055
1829 distinct rules cover the 63 techniques recorded for this group. The 2052 technique-to-rule mappings resolve to 1829 distinct rules, because one rule can cover several techniques. 1198 Sigma · 631 Splunk.
53 covered by at least one rule10 with no coverage1829 distinct rules in total
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