Medusa Group has leveraged Mimikatz to dump LSASS to harvest credentials.5
group
Medusa Group G1051
- Created
- 15 October 2025
- Last modified
- 31 July 2026
- Alias
- Medusa Group
Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” [1] [2] Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. [3] For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. [4]
57
TechniquesTop 11%
13
TacticsTop 15%
5
Tools & malware60th pct
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
MITRE reference G1051
Medusa Group has accessed the ntds.dit file to engage in credential dumping.6
Medusa Group has obtained host network details utilizing the command cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all.7
Medusa Group has used PDQ Inventory to get an inventory of the endpoints on the network.8
Medusa Group has used RDP to conduct lateral movement and exfiltrate data.9 Medusa Group has also utilized the Windows executable mstsc.exe for RDP activities through the command mstsc.exe /v:{hostname/ip}.9
Medusa Group has packed the code of dropped kernel drivers using the packer ASM Guard.11
Standing G1051
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this group touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 176 ATT&CK groups only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques57Top 11%
89th percentile · 89% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics13Top 15%
85th percentile · 85% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many tactics spanned or fewer.
Tools & malware560th pct
60th percentile · 60% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many tools and malware or fewer.
Campaigns089% tie · 4 values
89% of the population shares a single value across only 4 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique21med55th pct
55th percentile · 55% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many detection rules per technique or fewer.
Tests / technique7med
Detection coverage G1051
2218 distinct rules cover the 57 techniques recorded for this group. The 2516 technique-to-rule mappings resolve to 2218 distinct rules, because one rule can cover several techniques. 1444 Sigma · 774 Splunk.
52 covered by at least one rule5 with no coverage2218 distinct rules in total
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