Strider has used local servers with both local network and Internet access to act as internal proxy nodes to exfiltrate data from other parts of the network without direct Internet access.3
group
Strider G0041
- Created
- 31 May 2017
- Last modified
- 31 July 2026
- Aliases
- Strider · ProjectSauron
Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.[1][2]
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
MITRE reference G0041
Strider has registered its persistence module on domain controllers as a Windows LSA (Local System Authority) password filter to acquire credentials any time a domain, local user, or administrator logs in or changes a password.4
Strider has used a hidden file system that is stored as a file on disk.5
Standing G0041
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this group touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 176 ATT&CK groups only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
9th percentile · 91% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more Enterprise techniques.
26th percentile · 74% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tactics spanned.
23rd percentile · 77% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tools and malware.
89% of the population shares a single value across only 4 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
9th percentile · 91% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more detection rules per technique.
Detection coverage G0041
11 distinct rules cover the 3 techniques recorded for this group. 9 Sigma · 2 Splunk.
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