tfMITRE ATT&CK technique

Safe Mode Boot T1688

Tactic: Defense Impairment
Platform: Windows
Version: 1.0
Created: 14 April 2026
Last modified: 12 May 2026
Contributors: Jorell Magtibay, National Australia Bank Limited; Kiyohito Yamamoto, RedLark, NTT Communications; Yusuke Kubo, RedLark, NTT Communications

Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.[1][2]

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsNone recorded

Threat groupsNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malware71st pct

Tools & malware71st percentile · 71% of ATT&CK techniques have this many tools implementing them or fewer.

Detection rules42nd pct

Detection rules42nd percentile · 58% of ATT&CK techniques have more detection rules written.

Safe Mode Boot MITRE reference T1688

71st pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of tools

7 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.

EmbargoS1247 ↗

Has used a DLL variant of MDeployer to disable security solutions through Safe Mode.1

created 2025-10-19MALWAREcarried by 1 group

QilinS1242 ↗

Can reboot targeted systems in safe mode to avoid detection.1 2

created 2025-09-26MALWAREcarried by 2 groups

RansomHubS1212 ↗

Can reboot targeted systems into Safe Mode prior to encryption.1

created 2025-03-17MALWARE

LockBit 3.0S1202 ↗

Can reboot the infected host into Safe Mode.1

created 2025-02-05MALWARE

Black BastaS1070 ↗

Can reboot victim machines in safe mode with networking via bcdedit /set safeboot network.1 2 3 4 5

created 2023-03-08MALWAREcarried by 1 group

AvosLockerS1053 ↗

Can restart a compromised machine in safe mode.1 2

created 2023-01-11MALWARE

All 7 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview

Offense vs defense T1688

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 0Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 1

first rule: 2021 Q4

Safe Mode Boot detection strategy DET0116

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detection Strategy for Safe Mode Boot Abuse

Enterprise

1 platform

AN0323 · Windows

Abuse of safe mode via BCD modification, boot configuration utilities (bcdedit.exe, bootcfg.exe), and registry persistence under SafeBoot keys. Defender view: suspicious boot configuration changes correlated with registry edits that enable adversary persistence or disable defenses.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=4688
Windows Registry Key CreationDC0056	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=12
Windows Registry Key ModificationDC0063	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=13, 14

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
SafeBootRegistryPaths	Customize monitored registry paths for safe mode service additions.
AllowedAdminTools	Whitelist legitimate administrative use of bcdedit/bootcfg for troubleshooting.
TimeWindow	Correlate registry modifications and boot configuration commands within a short timeframe.

Tests1Executorscmd 1Need elevation1 of 1Have prerequisites0Have cleanup1Platformswindows

#	Test	Platform	Executor	Elevation	Prereqs	Cleanup	Ref
01	Safe Mode Boot	windows	cmd	Required	—	Yes
Allows adversaries to abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with limited boot Attack command bcdedit /set safeboot network Cleanup command bcdedit /deletevalue {current} safeboot GUIDbb61c03e-4cef-49e2-9c51-220e7863aec6

Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition

Safe Mode Boot detections T1688

1 rule is mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

42nd pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

Severity

Library

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