Domain or Tenant Policy Modification T1484
- Platforms
- Windows, Identity Provider
- Version
- 4.0
- Created
- 07 March 2019
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributor
- Obsidian Security
Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.
Offense vs defense T1484
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification detection strategy DET0270
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 2 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Domain or Tenant Policy Modifications via AD and Identity Provider
AN0755 · Windows
Adversary modifies Group Policy Objects (GPOs), domain trust, or directory service objects via GUI, CLI, or programmatic APIs. Behavior includes creation/modification of GPOs, delegation permissions, trust objects, or rogue domain controller registration.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| File ModificationDC0061 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656 |
| Active Directory Object ModificationDC0066 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=5136 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| ObjectDN | Filter to specific AD containers (e.g., CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=com) for GPOs. |
| AttributeModified | Focus on high-risk attributes such as gPCFileSysPath, ntSecurityDescriptor. |
| TimeWindow | Correlate changes with suspicious process creation or privileged user logon. |
| UserContext | Alert on unexpected user or service account modifying domain policy. |
AN0756 · Identity Provider
Adversary modifies tenant policy through changes to federation configuration, trust settings, or identity provider additions in Microsoft 365/AzureAD via Portal, PowerShell, or Graph API. Includes setting authentication to federated or updating federated domains.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account AuthenticationDC0002 | azure:signinlogs | OperationName=SetDomainAuthentication OR Set-FederatedDomain |
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | m365:unified | Set federation settings on domain|Set domain authentication|Add federated identity provider |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| OperationName | Identify rare modification operations that are not part of standard admin lifecycle. |
| InitiatedBy | Filter by known administrators or service principals. Flag unknown initiators. |
| UserAgent | Detect scripted modifications (e.g., PowerShell/Graph API vs Azure Portal). |
| TimeWindow | Correlate tenant policy changes with new sign-ins or token forgery attempts. |
Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as BloodHound (version 1.5.1 and later).
Use least privilege and protect administrative access to the Domain Controller and Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server. Do not create service accounts with administrative privileges.
Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.