MEDUSA can execute code through dynamic linker hijacking of the LD_PRELOAD library.5
Execution · Stealth7 detection rules
Standing S1220
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques4Bottom 17%
17th percentile · 83% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics3Bottom 21%
21st percentile · 79% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat group161% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaign185% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique3.5medBottom 3%
3rd percentile · 97% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique3.5med
MEDUSA detections S1220
14 distinct rules cover the 4 techniques recorded for this malware. 11 Splunk · 3 Sigma.
3 covered by at least one rule1 with no coverage14 distinct rules in total
The following analytic hunts for any creations or modifications to GitHub Actions workflow YAML files across the organization's Linux or Windows endpoints. (...)
The following analytic detects suspicious preload hijacking via the `preload` file, which may indicate an attacker's attempt to intercept or manipulate library loading processes. (...)
This detection identifies file creation events associated with the installation of the Medusa rootkit, a userland LD_PRELOAD-based rootkit known for deploying shared objects, loader binaries, and configuration files into specific system directories. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of RAR Self-Extracting (SFX) files by monitoring the generation of file related to rar sfx .tmp file creation during sfx installation. (...)