Janicab used a valid AppleDeveloperID to sign the code to get past security restrictions.7
Defense Impairment1 detection rules
Standing S0163
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques4Bottom 17%
17th percentile · 83% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics541st pct
41st percentile · 59% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat groups061% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique12medBottom 22%
22nd percentile · 78% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique3.5med
Janicab detections S0163
41 distinct rules cover the 4 techniques recorded for this malware. 23 Sigma · 18 Splunk.
4 covered by at least one rule41 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-41 of 41 rules
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MITRE ATT&CK
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ID
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Detects attempts to record audio using the arecord and ecasound utilities.
The following analytic detects the use of the crontab command with the list parameter (-l) to enumerate scheduled tasks configured in the invoking user's crontab on Linux systems. (...)
The following analytic detects potential tampering with cronjob files on a Linux system by identifying 'echo' commands that append code to existing cronjob files. (...)
The following analytic detects potential unauthorized modifications to Linux cronjobs using text editors like "nano," "vi," or "vim." It identifies this activity by monitoring command-line executions that interact with cronjob configuration paths. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Remcos folder within the AppData directory, specifically targeting keylog and clipboard log files. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of image files in the AppData folder by processes that also have a file reference in the same folder. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of .wav files in the AppData folder, a behavior associated with Remcos RAT malware, which stores audio recordings in this location for data exfiltration. (...)