malware
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
5th percentile · 95% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
6th percentile · 94% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
7th percentile · 93% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
16th percentile · 84% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more atomic tests per technique.
54% of the population shares a single value across only 11 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
57th percentile · 57% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many mitigations per technique or fewer.
5 of 8 axes carry an honest rank on this page. Coverage medians are taken across this malware’s 1 Enterprise technique.
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
5 distinct rules cover the 1 technique recorded for this malware. 4 Sigma · 1 Splunk.
| Select | Title | Description | Category | Status | Event | OS | Product | MITRE ATT&CK | CVEs | Severity | Author | Created | Updated | ID | Refs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Well-known DNS Exfiltration tools execution | Generic | test | process_creation | windows | Sysmon · WinEventLog Security | - | high | Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community | 2019-10-24 | 2021-11-27 | 98a96a5a-64a0-4c42-92c5-489da3866cb0 | ||||
Detects attempts of decoding encoded Gzip archives via PowerShell. | Generic | test | process_creation | windows | Sysmon · WinEventLog Security | - | medium | Hieu Tran | 2023-03-13 | — | 98767d61-b2e8-4d71-b661-e36783ee24c1 | ||||
Splunk | The following analytic detects HTTP POST requests containing heavily encoded data in the post body, specifically looking for sequences of hex-encoded bytes or base64-encoded strings. (...) | Anomaly | stable | network_connection | - | Zeek | - | medium | Raven Tait, Splunk | 2026-10-12 | 2026-10-12 | 0590881d-7b81-48dd-9674-1f23f7db5d40 | |||
Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive via PowerShell. (...) | Generic | test | process_creation | windows | Sysmon · WinEventLog Security | - | medium | frack113 | 2022-12-23 | — | d75d6b6b-adb9-48f7-824b-ac2e786efe1f | ||||
Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive in a PowerShell script. (...) | Generic | test | ps_script | windows | PowerShell | - | medium | frack113 | 2022-12-23 | — | df69cb1d-b891-4cd9-90c7-d617d90100ce |