Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol T1048.001
- Tactic
- Exfiltration
- Platforms
- Linux, macOS, Windows, ESXi
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 15 March 2020
- Last modified
- 24 October 2025
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Offense vs defense T1048.001
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol detection strategy DET0503
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Behavioral Detection Strategy for Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol
AN1389 · Windows
Detects the execution of non-browser processes establishing outbound encrypted network connections using uncommon symmetric encryption protocols (e.g., AES via PowerShell or custom scripts) to alternate external destinations.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| Network Connection CreationDC0082 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=3, 22 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| PayloadEntropyThreshold | Flag high-entropy payloads sent over unexpected protocols. |
| TimeWindow | Define allowable transfer window (e.g., abnormal traffic outside business hours). |
| ExecutableAllowlist | List of known-good binaries for encrypted traffic (e.g., Chrome, Outlook). |
AN1390 · Linux
Detects command-line utilities or scripts using encryption libraries or symmetric algorithms (e.g., OpenSSL AES, GPG, Python + PyCrypto) in conjunction with outbound file transfers or traffic to external destinations.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | auditd:SYSCALL | execve |
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | NSM:Flow | conn.log or flow data |
| Network Connection CreationDC0082 | auditd:SYSCALL | connect |
| Network Traffic ContentDC0085 | NSM:Flow | ssl.log (for TLS handshake analysis), dns.log (tunneling indicators) |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| FileTransferIndicator | Threshold for transferred data size or extension type. |
| LibraryCallTracking | Hooks into use of encryption libraries like libcrypto.so, pycrypto, gpg. |
AN1391 · macOS
Detects symmetric key-based encryption operations (e.g., AES via Python, AppleScript, or OpenSSL) followed by unusual outbound connections from non-browser applications or scripted tools.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | macos:unifiedlog | log stream process subsystem |
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | macos:osquery | socket_events |
| Network Connection CreationDC0082 | macos:unifiedlog | log stream network activity |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| ApplicationProfileBaseline | Expected outbound connection profiles per app. |
| EncryptionRoutinePattern | Indicators of manual encryption operations (e.g., script strings invoking AES). |
AN1392 · ESXi
Detects unexpected encrypted egress traffic from management services (e.g., hostd) or guest VMs utilizing symmetric encryption without traditional protocols (e.g., FTP with embedded AES ciphertext).
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | esxi:hostd | execution + payload hints |
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | esxi:vmkernel | egress log analysis |
| Network Traffic ContentDC0085 | NSM:Flow | host switch egress data |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| GuestVMExfilWatchlist | VMs with data sensitivity labels or outside normal behavior. |
| ServiceEgressProfile | Expected egress destinations and volume for core services. |
Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network.
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.
Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network.