The Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using Spearphishing Voice (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the “ShinyHunters” group. The observed infrastructure and TTPs used during the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign overlap with those used by threat groups with suspected ties to the broader collective known as "The Com.” These overlaps could plausibly be the result of associated actors operating within the same communities and are not necessarily an indication of a direct operational relationship.[1][2]
18
Techniques54th pct
11
TacticsTop 23%
1
Tool or malware45th pct
0
Threat groupsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
Salesforce Data Exfiltration MITRE reference C0059
During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used voice calls to socially engineer victims into authorizing a modified version of the Salesforce Data Loader app.4
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this campaign touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 56 ATT&CK campaigns only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques1854th pct
54th percentile · 54% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics11Top 23%
77th percentile · 77% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have this many tactics spanned or fewer.
Tool or malware145th pct
45th percentile · 55% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more tools and malware.
Threat groups055% tie · 3 values
55% of the population shares a single value across only 3 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique9medBottom 23%
23rd percentile · 77% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique0medBottom 23%
23rd percentile · 77% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more atomic tests per technique.
Data comps / technique3med43% tie · 7 values
43% of the population shares a single value across only 7 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Mitigations / technique1med38th pct
38th percentile · 62% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more mitigations per technique.
6 of 8 axes carry an honest rank on this page. Coverage medians are taken across this campaign’s 18 Enterprise techniques.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Detects the Linux-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency by Axios NPM package, including payload download via curl and detached execution using nohup and python3. (...)
This analytic detects creation of a Cisco IOS-XE tunnel interface with tunnel source, tunnel destination, and an IP address in the 10.10.12.0 network. (...)
Detects Formbook like process executions that inject code into a set of files in the System32 folder, which executes a special command command line to delete the dropper from the AppData Temp folder. (...)