Has deleted Windows event logs.1
Clear Windows Event Logs T1685.005
- Tactic
- Defense Impairment
- Platform
- Windows
- Version
- 1.0
- Created
- 14 April 2026
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributor
- Lucas Heiligenstein
Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.
Clear Windows Event Logs MITRE reference T1685.005
14 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has selectively cleared Windows Event Logs, system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence of intrusion activity.1
Clears Windows Event Logs following activity to evade defenses.1
Has cleared actor-performed actions from logs.1
Has used Cobalt Strike to empty log files.1 Additionally, Indrik Spider has cleared all event logs using wevutil.2
All 14 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
2 campaigns have been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
During Operation Wocao, the threat actors deleted all Windows system and security event logs using /Q /c wevtutil cl system and /Q /c wevtutil cl security.1
During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace cleared Windows event logs post compromise.1
All 2 campaigns for this technique
26 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can delete events from the Security, System, and Application logs.1
Calls Wevtutil to clear the Windows PowerShell and Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational logs.1
Can delete infected system log information.1
All 26 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1685.005
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Clear Windows Event Logs detection strategy DET0532
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Event Log Clearing on Windows via Behavioral Chain
AN1472 · Windows
Detects behavioral sequence where an adversary gains elevated privileges and clears event logs using native binaries (e.g., wevtutil), PowerShell, or direct file deletion of .evtx files.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=1102 |
| File DeletionDC0040 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=23 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TimeWindow | Time range between log-clearing command and 1102 event; tunable to reduce false positives |
| UserContext | Filter by admin/elevated users; allow tuning to detect abuse of high-privilege accounts |
| CommandLinePattern | Match common variations of log-clearing commands like Remove-EventLog, wevtutil cl |
| TargetLogName | Scope detection to Security, System, Application, or custom logs based on environment |
Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.
Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system.
Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition