Disables OpenSSH, system (systemd), and audit logs (/sbin/auditd) when the backdoor is active.1
Disable or Modify Linux Audit System Log T1685.004
- Tactic
- Defense Impairment
- Platform
- Linux
- Version
- 1.0
- Created
- 14 April 2026
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributor
- Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
Adversaries may disable or modify the Linux Audit system to hide malicious activity and avoid detection. Linux admins use the Linux Audit system to track security-relevant information on a system. The Linux Audit system operates at the kernel-level and maintains event logs on application and system activity such as process, network, file, and login events based on pre-configured rules.
Disable or Modify Linux Audit System Log MITRE reference T1685.004
1 software entry is documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
All 1 software entries for this technique
Offense vs defense T1685.004
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Disable or Modify Linux Audit System Log detection strategy DET0062
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Disable or Modify Linux Audit System Log
AN0171 · Linux
Disabling or modifying the Linux Audit system through process termination (auditd killed), service management (systemctl stop auditd), or tampering with rule/configuration files (/etc/audit/audit.rules, audit.conf). Defender view: suspicious execution of auditctl/systemctl commands, file modifications to audit rules, or sudden absence of audit logs correlated with privileged execution.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process ModificationDC0020 | auditd:SYSCALL | kill syscalls targeting auditd process |
| Service MetadataDC0041 | linux:syslog | auditd service stopped or disabled |
| File ModificationDC0061 | auditd:FILE | Modification or deletion of /etc/audit/audit.rules or /etc/audit/audit.conf |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | auditd:EXECVE | Execution of auditctl, systemctl stop auditd, or kill -9 auditd |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| ServiceWhitelist | Exclude legitimate administrative service stops during system maintenance. |
| FilePathScope | Specify monitored paths (/etc/audit/audit.rules, audit.conf) to avoid false positives from unrelated file writes. |
| TimeWindow | Correlate suspicious commands, file modifications, and audit log gaps in short succession. |
Routinely check account role permissions to ensure only expected users and roles have permission to modify logging settings.
To ensure Audit rules can not be modified at runtime, add the auditctl -e 2 as the last command in the audit.rules files. Once started, any attempt to change the configuration in this mode will be audited and denied. The configuration can only be changed by rebooting the machine.
An adversary must already have root level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition