Has used AI to clone video-conferencing applications to distribute their BeaverTail malware. They have also used AI to create deepfake videos. 1
- Tactic
- Resource Development
- Platform
- PRE
- Version
- 1.0
- Created
- 25 March 2026
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributors
- Gilberto Pérez; Alex Wong; Patrick Mkhael (aka Pinguino)
Adversaries may create or manipulate audio, image, and video content to support targeting and malicious operations. Adversaries may also use synthetic voice recordings, real-time altered audio or video during live interactions, fabricated profile photos and identity documents, or video content depicting fabricated or impersonated individuals.[1]
Audio-Visual Content MITRE reference T1683.002
2 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has used phishing pages appearing like legitimate banking login portals to compromise credentials.1
All 2 groups for this technique
Offense vs defense T1683.002
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
Audio-Visual Content detection strategy DET0918
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Audio-Visual Content
AN2061 · PRE
Much of this takes place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on designing defenses that are not reliant on atomic indicators.