Has avoided interacting with specific directories in order to reduce the likelihood of detection.1
Selective Exclusion T1679
- Tactic
- Stealth
- Platform
- Windows
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 25 September 2025
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may intentionally exclude certain files, folders, directories, file types, or system components from encryption or tampering during a ransomware or malicious payload execution. Some file extensions that adversaries may avoid encrypting include .dll, .exe, and .lnk.[1]
Selective Exclusion MITRE reference T1679
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
All 1 groups for this technique
6 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can enumerate the hostname of the system to determine if it is a domain controller and exclude it from being wiped if so.1
Has recursively enumerated directories with the exception of the following: System32, Windows, Program Files, Program Files(x86), Temp, Recycle.Bin, $Recycle.Bin, Boot, PerfLogs, AppData, Documents and Settings.12
Can avoid overwriting file names that contain “desktop.ini” and “conf.conf." 1
Has avoided encrypting specific files and directories by leveraging a regular expression within the ransomware binary.1
Has the capability to scan for file names, file extensions, and avoids pre-designated path names and file types.12
Has avoided specified files, file extensions and folders to ensure successful execution of the payload and continued operations of the impacted device.123
All 6 software entries for this technique
Offense vs defense T1679
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
Selective Exclusion detection strategy DET0897
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Selective Exclusion
AN2030 · Windows
A process with no prior history or outside of known whitelisted tools initiates file or registry modifications to configure exclusion rules for antivirus, backup, or file-handling systems. Or a file system enumeration for specific file names andcritical extensions like .dll, .exe, .sys, or specific directories such as 'Program Files' or security tool paths or system component discovery for the exclusion of the files or components.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4688 |
| File ModificationDC0061 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656 |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | WinEventLog:PowerShell | EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TimeWindow | Correlate multiply discovery activities and file enumeration activities. |
| DiscoveryActivityThreshold | Minimum number of different discovery techniques within time window to trigger detection - balance between false positives and coverage (default: 4 activities) |
| ExclusionTargetList | List of extensions or folders considered suspicious when excluded (e.g., .dll, .exe, C:\\Program Files\\) |
| AuthorizedExclusionModifiers | Whitelist of known system management tools/processes allowed to modify exclusion settings |