Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy T1666
- Tactic
- Defense Impairment
- Platform
- IaaS
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 25 September 2024
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may attempt to modify hierarchical structures in infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments in order to evade defenses.
Offense vs defense T1666
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy detection strategy DET0155
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy
AN0442 · IaaS
Monitor for unauthorized or unusual modifications to cloud resource hierarchies such as AWS Organizations or Azure Management Groups. Defenders may observe anomalous calls to APIs like LeaveOrganization, CreateAccount, MoveAccount, or Azure subscription transfers. Correlate account activity with administrative role assignments, tenant transfers, or new subscription creation that deviates from organizational baselines. Multi-event correlation should track role elevation followed by hierarchy modifications within a short time window.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud Service ModificationDC0069 | AWS:CloudTrail | LeaveOrganization: API calls severing accounts from AWS Organizations |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TimeWindow | Threshold for correlating role elevation with hierarchy modification events. |
| PrivilegedRoleList | List of high-privilege roles (e.g., Global Administrator, OrganizationAccountAccessRole) used to monitor sensitive modifications. |
| SubscriptionTransferPatterns | Patterns of subscription changes that may indicate hijacking or unauthorized tenant transfers. |
Periodically audit resource groups in the cloud management console to ensure that only expected items exist, especially close to the top of the hierarchy (e.g., AWS accounts and Azure subscriptions). Typically, top-level accounts (such as the AWS management account) should not contain any workloads or resources.
In Azure environments, consider setting a policy to block subscription transfers. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control Policies to prevent the use of the LeaveOrganization API call.
Limit permissions to add, delete, or modify resource groups to only those required.