Has called or sent text messages or emails to employees of victim organizations to demand payment in Bitcoin within 72 hours. Email addresses used in extortion activities include shinycorp@tuta[.]com, shinygroup@tuta[.]com, shinycorp@tutanota[.]com, and shinygroup@onionmail[.]com.1234567
Financial Theft T1657
- Tactic
- Impact
- Platforms
- Linux, macOS, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows
- Version
- 1.2
- Created
- 18 August 2023
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributors
- Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence; Pawel Partyka, Microsoft Threat Intelligence; Menachem Goldstein
Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware,[1] business email compromise (BEC) and fraud,[2] "pig butchering,"[3] bank hacking,[4] and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.[5]
Financial Theft MITRE reference T1657
17 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has engaged in cryptocurrency mining and theft.12 TeamPCP has also partnered with ransomware and data theft extortion groups, sold leaked code, and crowdsourced supply chain compromises by open-sourcing their Mini Shai-Hulud malware.345
Has conducted data exfiltration and posted stolen information on data leak sites for the purposes of financial and political extortion.12 VOID MANTICORE has also sold stolen data to prospective buyers for cryptocurrency.2
Has engaged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating data and directly contacting victims when the primary organization refuses to pay along with posting data on their data leak sites.123
Has stolen cryptocurrency wallet credentials and credit card information utilizing BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware.1234567
Has stolen and encrypted victims' data in order to extort victims into paying a ransom.123456
All 17 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors demanded ransom payments to unencrypt filesystems and to refrain from publishing sensitive data exfiltrated from victim networks.1
All 1 campaigns for this technique
8 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can search filesystems for cryptocurrency wallets such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Zcash, Dash, Ripple, and Monero.123
Has the ability to steal credentials for cryptocurrency wallets.123
Has stolen cryptocurrency wallet details from victim devices.12
Has been leveraged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, to prompt victims to pay a ransom.12
Has searched the victim device for browser extensions commonly associated with cryptocurrency wallets.12345
Has searched the victim device credentials and files commonly associated with cryptocurrency wallets.1234
All 8 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1657
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
Financial Theft detection strategy DET0495
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 5 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Financial Theft
AN1361 · Windows
Monitor for anomalous access to financial applications, browser-based banking sessions, or enterprise ERP systems from Windows endpoints. Detect mass emailing of payment instructions, sudden rule changes in Outlook for financial staff, or use of clipboard data exfiltration tied to cryptocurrency wallet addresses.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| Logon Session CreationDC0067 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4624, 4648 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| FinanceAppList | Baseline of finance-related executables or ERP processes to monitor closely. |
| HighRiskAccounts | Accounts belonging to finance, treasury, or executives that should be monitored with higher sensitivity. |
AN1362 · Linux
Monitor server and endpoint logs for unusual outbound network connections to cryptocurrency nodes, unauthorized scripts accessing financial systems, or automation targeting payment file formats. Detect curl/wget activity aimed at exfiltrating transaction data or credentials from financial apps.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | linux:syslog | Authentication attempts into finance-related servers from unusual IPs or times |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | auditd:SYSCALL | execve: Execution of curl, wget, or custom scripts accessing financial endpoints |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| KnownFinanceIPs | Whitelisted IPs for finance-related traffic to reduce noise. |
AN1363 · macOS
Monitor unified logs for access to payment applications, browser plug-ins, or Apple Pay services from non-standard processes. Detect anomalous use of Automator scripts or keychain extraction targeting financial account credentials.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | macos:unifiedlog | Non-standard processes invoking financial applications or payment APIs |
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | macos:unifiedlog | Anomalous keychain access attempts targeting payment credentials |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| MonitoredApps | Financial or payment applications to explicitly monitor for unauthorized use. |
AN1364 · SaaS
Monitor SaaS financial systems (e.g., QuickBooks, Workday, SAP S/4HANA cloud) for unauthorized access, rule changes, or mass export of financial data. Detect anomalous transfers initiated via SaaS APIs or new MFA-disabled logins targeting finance apps.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | saas:finance | Transaction/Transfer: Unusual or large transactions initiated outside business hours or by unusual accounts |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TransactionThreshold | Customizable monetary threshold above which financial transactions should be flagged. |
AN1365 · Office Suite
Monitor email and document management systems for fraudulent invoices, impersonation of vendors, or BEC-style payment redirections. Detect abnormal editing of invoice templates, or emails containing known fraud language combined with attachment delivery.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | m365:unified | MailSend: Outlook messages with suspicious subject/body terms (e.g., urgent payment, wire transfer) targeting finance teams |
| File ModificationDC0061 | m365:office | Anomalous editing of invoice or payment document templates |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| FraudTerms | Adjustable keyword list for email and document fraud detection. |
Limit access/authority to execute sensitive transactions, and switch to systems and procedures designed to authenticate/approve payments and purchase requests outside of insecure communication lines such as email.
Train and encourage users to identify social engineering techniques used to enable financial theft. Also consider training users on procedures to prevent and respond to swatting and doxing, acts increasingly deployed by financially motivated groups to further coerce victims into satisfying ransom/extortion demands.