Has poisoned search engine results to return fake software updates in order to distribute malware.12
- Tactic
- Resource Development
- Platform
- PRE
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 30 September 2022
- Last modified
- 15 April 2025
- Contributors
- Menachem Goldstein; Vijay Lalwani; Will Thomas, Equinix Threat Analysis Center (ETAC); Will Jolliffe; Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation; Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India; Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India
Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.[1][2]
SEO Poisoning MITRE reference T1608.006
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
All 1 groups for this technique
Offense vs defense T1608.006
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
SEO Poisoning detection strategy DET0881
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of SEO Poisoning
AN2013 · PRE
If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content related to SEO poisoning or Drive-by Target have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content supporting a strategic web compromise. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as Drive-by Compromise or Exploitation for Client Execution.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Response ContentDC0104 | Internet Scan | None |
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.