Contagious InterviewG1052 ↗
Had identified and solicited victims through social media such as LinkedIn, X, and Telegram.123456
tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique
Social Media T1593.001
sub-technique of T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains
- Tactic
- Reconnaissance
- Platform
- PRE
- Version
- 1.0
- Created
- 02 October 2020
- Last modified
- 24 October 2025
Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff.
ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact
3
Threat groups64th pct
Threat groups64th percentile · 64% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.1
Campaigns72nd pct
Campaigns72nd percentile · 72% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.0
Detection rulesNone recorded
Detection rulesNone recorded · 33% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.Social Media MITRE reference T1593.001
64th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
3 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
EXOTIC LILYG1011 ↗
Has copied data from social media sites to impersonate targeted individuals.1
KimsukyG0094 ↗
Has used Twitter to monitor potential victims and to prepare targeted phishing e-mails.1
All 3 groups for this technique
1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
Operation Dream JobC0022 ↗
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used LinkedIn to identify and target employees within a chosen organization.1
All 1 campaigns for this technique
Offense vs defense T1593.001
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
Social Media detection strategy DET0812
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Social Media
1 platform
AN1944 · PRE
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Pre-compromiseM1056
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties.