VOID MANTICOREG1055 ↗
Has developed or obtained trojanized applications used for persistent surveillance of targeted individuals.1
- Tactic
- Resource Development
- Platform
- PRE
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 01 October 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.
ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact
18
Threat groupsTop 10%
Threat groups90th percentile · 90% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.5
CampaignsTop 9%
Campaigns91st percentile · 91% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.1
Detection rules42nd pct
Detection rules42nd percentile · 58% of ATT&CK techniques have more detection rules written.Malware MITRE reference T1588.001
Top 10%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
18 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
UNC3886G1048 ↗
Has used the publicly available rootkits REPTILE and MEDUSA.1
TA2541G1018 ↗
Has used multiple strains of malware available for purchase on criminal forums or in open-source repositories.1
Scattered SpiderG1015 ↗
Has obtained malware to use at multiple stages of operations including information stealers, remote access tools, and ransomware.12
LuminousMothG1014 ↗
Has obtained and used malware such as Cobalt Strike.12
MetadorG1013 ↗
Has used unique malware in their operations, including metaMain and Mafalda.1
All 18 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
5 campaigns have been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
J-magic CampaignC0050 ↗
During the J-magic Campaign campaign, threat actors used open-source malware post-compromise including a custom variant of the cd00r backdoor.1
C0015C0015 ↗
For C0015, the threat actors used Cobalt Strike and Conti ransomware.1
Operation SpalaxC0005 ↗
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors obtained malware, including Remcos, njRAT, and AsyncRAT.1
FunnyDreamC0007 ↗
For FunnyDream, the threat actors used a new backdoor named FunnyDream.1
Night DragonC0002 ↗
During Night Dragon, threat actors used Trojans from underground hacker websites.1
All 5 campaigns for this technique
Offense vs defense T1588.001
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Range
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Campaigns · 4Sigma rules (cumulative) · 1Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 0
first rule: 2017 Q1 · 4 of 5 campaigns plotted (Night Dragon (dated 2009) falls before the 2014 window)Malware detection strategy DET0845
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Malware
1 platform
AN1977 · PRE
Monitor for contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Malware MetadataDC0003 | Malware Repository | None |
| Malware ContentDC0011 | Malware Repository | None |
Pre-compromiseM1056
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.