ShinyHuntersG1057 ↗
Has established multiple email accounts, such as shinycorp@tutonota[.]com, for use in extortion activities.12
- Tactic
- Resource Development
- Platform
- PRE
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 01 October 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information or Phishing.[1] Establishing email accounts may also allow adversaries to abuse free services – such as trial periods – to Acquire Infrastructure for follow-on purposes.[2]
ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact
20
Threat groupsTop 8%
Threat groups92nd percentile · 92% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.8
CampaignsTop 5%
Campaigns95th percentile · 95% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.0
Detection rulesNone recorded
Detection rulesNone recorded · 33% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.Email Accounts MITRE reference T1585.002
Top 8%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
20 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
VOID MANTICOREG1055 ↗
Has created email accounts to send threatening messages to victims to include ‘Handala_Team[@]outlook[.]com’.1
Contagious InterviewG1052 ↗
Has created fake email accounts to correspond with social media accounts, fake LinkedIn personas, code repository accounts, and job announcements on development job board services.123456 Contagious Interview has also utilized fake email accounts with Threat Intelligence vendor services.1
Medusa GroupG1051 ↗
Has created email accounts used in ransomware negotiations.1
APT42G1044 ↗
Has created email accounts to use in spearphishing operations.1
Moonstone SleetG1036 ↗
Has created email accounts to interact with victims, including for phishing purposes.1
All 20 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
8 campaigns have been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
SharePoint ToolShell ExploitationC0058 ↗
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors created Proton mail accounts for communication with organizations infected with ransomware.1
Operation Dream JobC0022 ↗
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake email accounts to correspond with fake LinkedIn personas; Lazarus Group also established email accounts to match those of the victim as part of their BEC attempt.1
FunnyDreamC0007 ↗
For FunnyDream, the threat actors likely established an identified email account to register a variety of domains that were used during the campaign.1
Operation WocaoC0014 ↗
For Operation Wocao, the threat actors registered email accounts to use during the campaign.1
Operation HoneybeeC0006 ↗
During Operation Honeybee, attackers created email addresses to register for a free account for a control server used for the implants.1
Operation Dust StormC0016 ↗
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established email addresses to register domains for their operations.1
All 8 campaigns for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1585.002
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
Email Accounts detection strategy DET0835
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Email Accounts
1 platform
AN1967 · PRE
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Phishing).
Pre-compromiseM1056
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.