tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

Services Registry Permissions Weakness T1574.011

sub-technique of T1574 Hijack Execution Flow

Tactics: Execution, Stealth
Platform: Windows
Version: 2.0
Created: 13 March 2020
Last modified: 12 May 2026
Contributors: Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank; Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward; Travis Smith, Tripwire

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services can allow adversaries to redirect the originally specified executable to one they control, launching their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. [1][2]

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsNone recorded

Threat groupsNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Campaigns72nd pct

Campaigns72nd percentile · 72% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.

Tools & malwareNone recorded

Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Detection rulesTop 19%

Detection rules81st percentile · 81% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

Services Registry Permissions Weakness MITRE reference T1574.011

72nd pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of campaigns

1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.

Operation HoneybeeC0006 ↗

During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a batch file that modified the COMSysApp service to load a malicious ipnet.dll payload and to load a DLL into the svchost.exe process.1

2017–2018

All 1 campaigns for this technique

Offense vs defense T1574.011

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 1Sigma rules (cumulative) · 11Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 2

first rule: 2019 Q4 · 1 of 1 campaigns plotted

Services Registry Permissions Weakness detection strategy DET0427

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detection Strategy for Hijack Execution Flow through Service Registry Premission Weakness.

Enterprise

1 platform

AN1195 · Windows

Unauthorized modification of service-related registry keys such as ImagePath, FailureCommand, ServiceDll, or Performance/Parameters keys. Defender correlates registry modifications, anomalous service metadata changes, and subsequent service process executions that deviate from baseline configurations.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=1
Windows Registry Key ModificationDC0063	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=4657
Service ModificationDC0065	WinEventLog:System	EventCode=7040

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
MonitoredServiceKeys	Registry subkeys for critical services (ImagePath, ServiceDll, FailureCommand, Parameters).
BaselineServiceConfig	Known good service registry configurations and paths for comparison.
TimeWindow	Correlation interval between registry/service modifications and service execution.
PrivilegedAccounts	Accounts permitted to modify service configurations.

4 analytics

The Sysinternals tool Autoruns checks the registry and file system for known identify persistence mechanisms. It will output any tools identified, including built-in or added-on Microsoft functionality and third party software. Many of these locations are known by adversaries and used to obtain Persistence. Running Autoruns periodically in an environment makes it possible to collect and monitor its output for differences, which may include the removal or addition of persistent tools. Depending on the persistence mechanism and location, legitimate software may be more likely to make changes than an adversary tool. Thus, this analytic may result in significant noise in a highly dynamic environment. While Autoruns is a convenient method to scan for programs using persistence mechanisms its scanning nature does not conform well to streaming based analytics. This analytic could be replaced with one that draws from sensors that collect registry and file information if streaming analytics are desired.

TypesSituational Awareness, TTPCoverageModerateSubmitted2013

D3FEND techniques

The defensive countermeasure this analytic implements, in MITRE’s D3FEND ontology.

ID	Name
D3-SICA	System Init Config Analysis

Registry modifications are often essential in establishing persistence via known Windows mechanisms. Many legitimate modifications are done graphically via regedit.exe or by using the corresponding channels, or even calling the Registry APIs directly. The built-in utility reg.exe provides a command-line interface to the registry, so that queries and modifications can be performed from a shell, such as cmd.exe. When a user is responsible for these actions, the parent of cmd.exe will likely be explorer.exe. Occasionally, power users and administrators write scripts that do this behavior as well, but likely from a different process tree. These background scripts must be learned so they can be tuned out accordingly.

TypeTTPCoverageModerateSubmitted2013

D3FEND techniques

The defensive countermeasure this analytic implements, in MITRE’s D3FEND ontology.

ID	Name
D3-PLA	Process Lineage Analysis

Data model references

The CAR data model objects, actions and fields the logic reads. Map these to your own schema before implementing.

Object	Action	Field
process	create	command_line
process	create	hostname
process	create	exe
process	create	parent_exe
process	create	pid
process	create	ppid

Implementations

Pseudocode is the canonical logic; the rest are CAR’s translations into vendor query languages.

To gain better context, it may be useful to also get information about the cmd process to know its parent. This may be helpful when tuning the analytic to an environment, if this behavior happens frequently. This may also help to rule out instances of users running

processes = search Process:Create
reg = filter processes where (exe == "reg.exe" and parent_exe == "cmd.exe")
cmd = filter processes where (exe == "cmd.exe" and parent_exe != "explorer.exe"")
reg_and_cmd = join (reg, cmd) where (reg.ppid == cmd.pid and reg.hostname == cmd.hostname)
output reg_and_cmd

DNIF version of the above pseudocode.

_fetch * from event where $LogName=WINDOWS-SYSMON AND $EventID=1 AND $Process=regex(.*reg\.exe.*)i AND $ParentProcess=regex(.*cmd\.exe.*)i as #A limit 100
>>_fetch * from event where $LogName=WINDOWS-SYSMON AND $EventID=1 AND $Process=regex(.*cmd\.exe.*)i NOT $ParentProcess=regex(.*explorer\.exe.*)i as #B limit 100
>>_checkif sjoin #B.$PPID = #A.$CPID str_compare #B.$SystemName eq #A.$SystemName include

Unit tests

CAR’s own validation procedures for this analytic.

Execute reg.exe from cmd.exe. Note that the analytic joins back to the grandparent process, which in this case is explorer.exe. The query time window must include the user log on. For example, if you logged in at 8am and tested the analytic at 10am, the query needs to search from 8am to 10am, not just at 10am. Within a command window, run the command.

["reg.exe QUERY HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft"]

Certain commands are frequently used by malicious actors and infrequently used by normal users. By looking for execution of these commands in short periods of time, we can not only see when a malicious user was on the system but also get an idea of what they were doing.

TypeTTPCoverageLowSubmitted2013

D3FEND techniques

The defensive countermeasure this analytic implements, in MITRE’s D3FEND ontology.

ID	Name
D3-PLA	Process Lineage Analysis

Data model references

The CAR data model objects, actions and fields the logic reads. Map these to your own schema before implementing.

Object	Action	Field
process	create	hostname
process	create	ppid
process	create	exe

Implementations

Pseudocode is the canonical logic; the rest are CAR’s translations into vendor query languages.

processes = search Process:Create
reg_processes = filter processes where (exe == "arp.exe" or exe == "at.exe" or exe == "attrib.exe"
 or exe == "cscript.exe" or exe == "dsquery.exe" or exe == "hostname.exe"
 or exe == "ipconfig.exe" or exe == "mimikatz.exe" or exe == "nbstat.exe"
 or exe == "net.exe" or exe == "netsh.exe" or exe == "nslookup.exe"
 or exe == "ping.exe" or exe == "quser.exe" or exe == "qwinsta.exe"
 or exe == "reg.exe" or exe == "runas.exe" or exe == "sc.exe"
 or exe == "schtasks.exe" or exe == "ssh.exe" or exe == "systeminfo.exe"
 or exe == "taskkill.exe" or exe == "telnet.exe" or exe == "tracert.exe"
 or exe == "wscript.exe" or exe == "xcopy.exe")
reg_grouped = group reg by hostname, ppid where(max time between two events is 30 minutes)
output reg_grouped

DNIF version of the above pseudocode.

_fetch * from event where $LogName=WINDOWS-SYSMON AND $EventID=1 AND $App=regex(arp\.exe|at\.exe|attrib\.exe|cscript\.exe|dsquery\.exe|hostname\.exe|ipconfig\.exe|mimikatz.exe|nbstat\.exe|net\.exe|netsh\.exe|nslookup\.exe|ping\.exe|quser\.exe|qwinsta\.exe|reg\.exe|runas\.exe|sc\.exe|schtasks\.exe|ssh\.exe|systeminfo\.exe|taskkill\.exe|telnet\.exe|tracert\.exe|wscript\.exe|xcopy\.exe)i group count_unique $App limit 100
>>_agg count
>>_checkif int_compare Count > 1 include

LogPoint version of the above pseudocode.

norm_id=WindowsSysmon event_id=1 image IN ["*\arp.exe", "*\at.exe", "*\attrib.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\dsquery.exe", "*\hostname.exe", "*\ipconfig.exe", "*\mimikatz.exe", "*\nbstat.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\netsh.exe", "*\nslookup.exe", "*\ping.exe", "*\quser.exe", "*\qwinsta.exe", "*\reg.exe", "*\runas.exe", "*\sc.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\ssh.exe", "*\systeminfo.exe", "*\taskkill.exe", "*\telnet.exe", "*\tracert.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\xcopy.exe"]
| chart count() as cnt by host
| search cnt > 1

Unit tests

CAR’s own validation procedures for this analytic.

Within a command window, execute several of the commands in quick succession.

["ipconfig /all","hostname","systeminfo","reg.exe Query HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft"]

LoLBAS are binaries and scripts that are built in to Windows, frequently are signed by Microsoft, and may be used by an attacker. Some LoLBAS are used very rarely and it might be possible to alert every time they're used (this would depend on your environment), but many others are very common and can't be simply alerted on.

TypeTTPCoverageLowSubmitted2020

D3FEND techniques

The defensive countermeasure this analytic implements, in MITRE’s D3FEND ontology.

ID	Name
D3-PSA	Process Spawn Analysis

Implementations

Pseudocode is the canonical logic; the rest are CAR’s translations into vendor query languages.

Pseudocode version of the below Splunk query.

processes = search Process:Create
lolbas_processes = filter processes where (exe = "At.exe" OR exe = "Atbroker.exe" OR exe = "Bash.exe" OR exe = "Bitsadmin.exe" OR exe = "Certutil.exe" OR exe = "Cmd.exe" OR exe = "Cmdkey.exe" OR exe = "Cmstp.exe" OR exe = "Control.exe" OR exe = "Csc.exe" OR exe = "Cscript.exe" OR exe = "Dfsvc.exe" OR exe = "Diskshadow.exe" OR exe = "Dnscmd.exe" OR exe = "Esentutl.exe" OR exe = "Eventvwr.exe" OR exe = "Expand.exe" OR exe = "Extexport.exe" OR exe = "Extrac32.exe" OR exe = "Findstr.exe" OR exe = "Forfiles.exe" OR exe = "Ftp.exe" OR exe = "Gpscript.exe" OR exe = "Hh.exe" OR exe = "Ie4uinit.exe" OR exe = "Ieexec.exe" OR exe = "Infdefaultinstall.exe" OR exe = "Installutil.exe" OR exe = "Jsc.exe" OR exe = "Makecab.exe" OR exe = "Mavinject.exe" OR exe = "Microsoft.Workflow.r.exe" OR exe = "Mmc.exe" OR exe = "Msbuild.exe" OR exe = "Msconfig.exe" OR exe = "Msdt.exe" OR exe = "Mshta.exe" OR exe = "Msiexec.exe" OR exe = "Odbcconf.exe" OR exe = "Pcalua.exe" OR exe = "Pcwrun.exe" OR exe = "Presentationhost.exe" OR exe = "Print.exe" OR exe = "Reg.exe" OR exe = "Regasm.exe" OR exe = "Regedit.exe" OR exe = "Register-cimprovider.exe" OR exe = "Regsvcs.exe" OR exe = "Regsvr32.exe" OR exe = "Replace.exe" OR exe = "Rpcping.exe" OR exe = "Rundll32.exe" OR exe = "Runonce.exe" OR exe = "Runscripthelper.exe" OR exe = "Sc.exe" OR exe = "Schtasks.exe" OR exe = "Scriptrunner.exe" OR exe = "SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe" OR exe = "Tttracer.exe" OR exe = "Verclsid.exe" OR exe = "Wab.exe" OR exe = "Wmic.exe" OR exe = "Wscript.exe" OR exe = "Wsreset.exe" OR exe = "Xwizard.exe" OR exe = "Advpack.dll OR exe = "Comsvcs.dll OR exe = "Ieadvpack.dll OR exe = "Ieaframe.dll OR exe = "Mshtml.dll OR exe = "Pcwutl.dll OR exe = "Setupapi.dll OR exe = "Shdocvw.dll OR exe = "Shell32.dll OR exe = "Syssetup.dll OR exe = "Url.dll OR exe = "Zipfldr.dll OR exe = "Appvlp.exe" OR exe = "Bginfo.exe" OR exe = "Cdb.exe" OR exe = "csi.exe" OR exe = "Devtoolslauncher.exe" OR exe = "dnx.exe" OR exe = "Dxcap.exe" OR exe = "Excel.exe" OR exe = "Mftrace.exe" OR exe = "Msdeploy.exe" OR exe = "msxsl.exe" OR exe = "Powerpnt.exe" OR exe = "rcsi.exe" OR exe = "Sqler.exe" OR exe = "Sqlps.exe" OR exe = "SQLToolsPS.exe" OR exe = "Squirrel.exe" OR exe = "te.exe" OR exe = "Tracker.exe" OR exe = "Update.exe" OR exe = "vsjitdebugger.exe" OR exe = "Winword.exe" OR exe = "Wsl.exe" OR exe = "CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 OR exe = "CL_Invocation.ps1 OR exe = "Manage-bde.wsf OR exe = "Pubprn.vbs OR exe = "Slmgr.vbs OR exe = "Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs OR exe = "winrm.vbs OR exe = "Pester.bat)
process_count = count(lolbas_processes) by process
process_count_avg = average(process_count)
process_count_stdev = standard_deviation(process_count)
lower_bound = process_count_avg - stdev * 1.5
outliers = filter lolbas_processes where (process_count < lower_bound)
return outliers

This Splunk query looks for instances of LoLBAS commands being executed, then stacks by rare command lines using a stddev.

index=__your_sysmon_index__ EventCode=1 (OriginalFileName = At.exe OR OriginalFileName = Atbroker.exe OR OriginalFileName = Bash.exe OR OriginalFileName = Bitsadmin.exe OR OriginalFileName = Certutil.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cmd.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cmdkey.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cmstp.exe OR OriginalFileName = Control.exe OR OriginalFileName = Csc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cscript.exe OR OriginalFileName = Dfsvc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Diskshadow.exe OR OriginalFileName = Dnscmd.exe OR OriginalFileName = Esentutl.exe OR OriginalFileName = Eventvwr.exe OR OriginalFileName = Expand.exe OR OriginalFileName = Extexport.exe OR OriginalFileName = Extrac32.exe OR OriginalFileName = Findstr.exe OR OriginalFileName = Forfiles.exe OR OriginalFileName = Ftp.exe OR OriginalFileName = Gpscript.exe OR OriginalFileName = Hh.exe OR OriginalFileName = Ie4uinit.exe OR OriginalFileName = Ieexec.exe OR OriginalFileName = Infdefaultinstall.exe OR OriginalFileName = Installutil.exe OR OriginalFileName = Jsc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Makecab.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mavinject.exe OR OriginalFileName = Microsoft.Workflow.r.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mmc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msbuild.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msconfig.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msdt.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mshta.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msiexec.exe OR OriginalFileName = Odbcconf.exe OR OriginalFileName = Pcalua.exe OR OriginalFileName = Pcwrun.exe OR OriginalFileName = Presentationhost.exe OR OriginalFileName = Print.exe OR OriginalFileName = Reg.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regasm.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regedit.exe OR OriginalFileName = Register-cimprovider.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regsvcs.exe OR OriginalFileName = Regsvr32.exe OR OriginalFileName = Replace.exe OR OriginalFileName = Rpcping.exe OR OriginalFileName = Rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName = Runonce.exe OR OriginalFileName = Runscripthelper.exe OR OriginalFileName = Sc.exe OR OriginalFileName = Schtasks.exe OR OriginalFileName = Scriptrunner.exe OR OriginalFileName = SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe OR OriginalFileName = Tttracer.exe OR OriginalFileName = Verclsid.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wab.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wmic.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wscript.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wsreset.exe OR OriginalFileName = Xwizard.exe OR OriginalFileName = Advpack.dll OR OriginalFileName = Comsvcs.dll OR OriginalFileName = Ieadvpack.dll OR OriginalFileName = Ieaframe.dll OR OriginalFileName = Mshtml.dll OR OriginalFileName = Pcwutl.dll OR OriginalFileName = Setupapi.dll OR OriginalFileName = Shdocvw.dll OR OriginalFileName = Shell32.dll OR OriginalFileName = Syssetup.dll OR OriginalFileName = Url.dll OR OriginalFileName = Zipfldr.dll OR OriginalFileName = Appvlp.exe OR OriginalFileName = Bginfo.exe OR OriginalFileName = Cdb.exe OR OriginalFileName = csi.exe OR OriginalFileName = Devtoolslauncher.exe OR OriginalFileName = dnx.exe OR OriginalFileName = Dxcap.exe OR OriginalFileName = Excel.exe OR OriginalFileName = Mftrace.exe OR OriginalFileName = Msdeploy.exe OR OriginalFileName = msxsl.exe OR OriginalFileName = Powerpnt.exe OR OriginalFileName = rcsi.exe OR OriginalFileName = Sqler.exe OR OriginalFileName = Sqlps.exe OR OriginalFileName = SQLToolsPS.exe OR OriginalFileName = Squirrel.exe OR OriginalFileName = te.exe OR OriginalFileName = Tracker.exe OR OriginalFileName = Update.exe OR OriginalFileName = vsjitdebugger.exe OR OriginalFileName = Winword.exe OR OriginalFileName = Wsl.exe OR OriginalFileName = CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 OR OriginalFileName = CL_Invocation.ps1 OR OriginalFileName = Manage-bde.wsf OR OriginalFileName = Pubprn.vbs OR OriginalFileName = Slmgr.vbs OR OriginalFileName = Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs OR OriginalFileName = winrm.vbs OR OriginalFileName = Pester.bat)|eval CommandLine=lower(CommandLine)|eventstats count(process) as procCount by process|eventstats avg(procCount) as avg stdev(procCount) as stdev|eval lowerBound=(avg-stdev*1.5)|eval isOutlier=if((procCount < lowerBound),1,0)|where isOutlier=1|table host, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, ParentCommandLine, procCount

Tests2ExecutorsPowerShell 1 · cmd 1Need elevation0 of 2Have prerequisites1Have cleanup1Platformswindows

Test

Platform

Executor

Elevation

Prereqs

Cleanup

Ref

Service Registry Permissions Weakness

windows

PowerShell

—

Service registry permissions weakness check and then which can lead to privilege escalation with ImagePath. eg. reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}" /f /v ImagePath /d "C:\temp\AtomicRedteam.exe"

Input arguments

Name	Type	Default	Description
weak_service_name	string	weakservicename	weak service check

Attack command

get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\* |FL
get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name} |FL

GUID4750fd3a-bbde-4913-85b9-81712b915af7

Service ImagePath Change with reg.exe

windows

cmd

—

Yes

Change Service registry ImagePath of a bengin service to a malicious file

Input arguments

Name	Type	Default	Description
weak_service_name	string	calcservice	weak service name
weak_service_path	string	%windir%\system32\win32calc.exe	weak service path
malicious_service_path	string	%windir%\system32\cmd.exe	malicious service path

Attack command

reg.exe add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}" /f /v ImagePath /d "#{malicious_service_path}"

Cleanup command

sc.exe delete #{weak_service_name}

Prerequisite

The service must exist (#{weak_service_name})

Check

if (Get-Service #{weak_service_name}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

Satisfy

sc.exe create #{weak_service_name} binpath= "#{weak_service_path}"

GUIDacf30e6a-edb1-463a-86df-726c00c0fafe

Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition

Services Registry Permissions Weakness detections T1574.011

13 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

Top 19%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

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