tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

Transmitted Data Manipulation T1565.002

sub-technique of T1565 Data Manipulation

Tactic: Impact
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Version: 1.1
Created: 02 March 2020
Last modified: 12 May 2026

Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.[1][2] By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groups45th pct

Threat groups45th percentile · 55% of ATT&CK techniques have more threat groups attributed.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malware62nd pct

Tools & malware62nd percentile · 62% of ATT&CK techniques have this many tools implementing them or fewer.

Detection rules50th pct

Detection rules50th percentile · 50% of ATT&CK techniques have more detection rules written.

Transmitted Data Manipulation MITRE reference T1565.002

45th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups

1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.

APT38G0082 ↗

Has used DYEPACK to manipulate SWIFT messages en route to a printer.1

created 2019-01-291 referenceaka NICKEL GLADSTONE

All 1 groups for this technique

Offense vs defense T1565.002

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 2Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 0

first rule: 2019 Q3

Transmitted Data Manipulation detection strategy DET0254

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detection Strategy of Transmitted Data Manipulation

Enterprise

3 platforms

AN0702 · Windows

Monitor for anomalies in transmitted data streams, including mismatched file integrity checks, API interception, or man-in-the-middle modifications. Detect unexpected use of APIs that handle network I/O where transmitted data integrity could be manipulated.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
File MetadataDC0059	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=15
Network Connection CreationDC0082	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=3, 22

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
IntegrityBaseline	Hash baselines or digital signature references to validate transmitted data.
MonitoredPorts	List of ports/services where data integrity validation is enforced.

AN0703 · Linux

Detect alterations of transmitted data via monitoring syscalls (send, recv, write) or middleware interception. Identify mismatched file hashes when compared at origin vs. destination. Watch for anomalous activity from processes interacting with secure transmission services (e.g., OpenSSL, scp).

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
OS API ExecutionDC0021	auditd:SYSCALL	send, recv, write: Abnormal interception or alteration of transmitted data
Network Traffic ContentDC0085	linux:syslog	Integrity mismatch warnings or malformed packets detected

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
WatchedProcesses	List of processes authorized to handle transmitted data (e.g., sshd, nginx).
HashCheckInterval	Frequency of out-of-band integrity verification checks.

AN0704 · macOS

Monitor system APIs such as CFNetwork and SecureTransport for anomalies in transmitted data streams. Detect mismatches in file hashes or SSL/TLS downgrade attempts that enable manipulation of transmitted data.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
OS API ExecutionDC0021	macos:osquery	CALCULATE: Integrity validation of transmitted data via hash checks
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	macos:unifiedlog	Suspicious anomalies in transmitted data integrity during application network operations

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
TLSValidationRules	Custom rules for enforcing HTTPS/TLS integrity checks to prevent downgrade manipulation.
AllowedApps	Whitelisted macOS apps permitted to transmit critical data.

Transmitted Data Manipulation detections T1565.002

2 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

50th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

Severity

Library

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