Has used a Wi-Fi Pineapple to set up Evil Twin Wi-Fi Poisoning for the purposes of capturing victim credentials or planting espionage-oriented malware.1
- Tactics
- Credential Access, Collection
- Platform
- Network Devices
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 17 September 2024
- Last modified
- 15 April 2025
- Contributors
- Menachem Goldstein; DeFord L. Smith
Adversaries may host seemingly genuine Wi-Fi access points to deceive users into connecting to malicious networks as a way of supporting follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or Input Capture.[1]
Evil Twin MITRE reference T1557.004
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
All 1 groups for this technique
Offense vs defense T1557.004
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
Evil Twin detection strategy DET0379
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detect Evil Twin Wi-Fi Access Points on Network Devices
AN1069 · Network Devices
Detects rogue Wi-Fi access points broadcasting the same SSID as legitimate APs with stronger signal strength, unexpected MAC/BSSID values, or inconsistent encryption settings. Correlates authentication attempts, captive portal redirections, and anomalous traffic flows through unauthorized APs.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | networkdevice:syslog | Failed authentication requests redirected to non-standard portals |
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | WLANLogs:Association | Multiple APs advertising the same SSID but with different BSSID/MAC or encryption type |
| Network Traffic ContentDC0085 | NSM:Flow | Probe responses from unauthorized APs responding to client probe requests |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| KnownSSIDs | Baseline of authorized SSIDs; deviations may indicate rogue AP. |
| AllowedBSSIDs | Whitelist of BSSID/MAC addresses mapped to corporate SSIDs. |
| SignalStrengthThreshold | Used to flag unusually strong signals from unexpected APs. |
| CaptivePortalDomains | Trusted login domains; unrecognized portals may be malicious. |
Wireless intrusion prevention systems (WIPS) can identify traffic patterns indicative of adversary-in-the-middle activity and scan for evils twins and rogue access points.
Train users to be suspicious about access points marked as “Open” or “Unsecure” as well as certificate errors. Certificate errors may arise when the application’s certificate does not match the one expected by the host.