Has modified LNK shortcuts.1
Shortcut Modification T1547.009
- Tactics
- Persistence, Privilege Escalation
- Platform
- Windows
- Version
- 1.3
- Created
- 24 January 2020
- Last modified
- 24 October 2025
- Contributors
- David French, Elastic; Bobby, Filar, Elastic; Travis Smith, Tripwire
Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.
Shortcut Modification MITRE reference T1547.009
4 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.1
Has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.12
Malware has maintained persistence on a system by creating a LNK shortcut in the user’s Startup folder.1
All 4 groups for this technique
25 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can modify the shortcut that launches Telegram by replacing its path with the malicious payload to launch with the legitimate executable.1
Can establish persistence by writing shortcuts to the Windows Startup folder.12
Can write or modify browser shortcuts to enable launching of malicious browser extensions.1
Can establish persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.1
Can persist by modifying a .LNK file to include a backdoor.1
All 25 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1547.009
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Shortcut Modification detection strategy DET0180
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for T1547.009 – Shortcut Modification (Windows)
AN0510 · Windows
Detection correlates file creation or modification of .lnk (shortcut) files in autostart locations with anomalous parent-child process lineage or unsigned binaries. Defenders should watch for LNK creation/modification events outside of known software installations, patch events, or OS updates. Flag shortcut targets pointing to suspicious locations or unknown binaries, particularly those written by script interpreters or spawned from phishing delivery chains.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| File CreationDC0039 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 |
| File MetadataDC0059 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=15 |
| File ModificationDC0061 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=2 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TargetPathRegex | Tunable regex to flag suspicious shortcut target paths (e.g., temp folder, base64 in target, unusual executable names) |
| TimeWindow | Time window used to correlate shortcut creation with process execution (e.g., 5-minute window) |
| UserContextScope | Filter for expected administrative installs versus end-user initiated shortcut creation |
| ZoneIdentifierThreshold | Configurable value to filter LNK files tagged with external source markers (e.g., ZoneId=3 for Internet) |
Prevents malicious shortcuts or LNK files from executing unwanted code by ensuring only authorized applications and scripts are allowed to run.
Applying strict permissions to directories where shortcuts are stored, such as the startup folder, can prevent unauthorized modifications.
Limit Privileges for Shortcut Creation: While the SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege is not directly related to .lnk file creation, you should still enforce least privilege principles by limiting user rights to create and modify shortcuts, especially in system-critical locations. This can be done through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create symbolic links. Regular User Permissions Review: Regularly review and audit user permissions to ensure that only necessary accounts have write access to startup folders and critical system directories.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition