Time Providers T1547.003
- Tactics
- Persistence, Privilege Escalation
- Platform
- Windows
- Version
- 1.2
- Created
- 24 January 2020
- Last modified
- 24 October 2025
- Contributors
- Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black; Harun Küßner
Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.[1] W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.[2]
Offense vs defense T1547.003
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Time Providers detection strategy DET0122
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detect Abuse of Windows Time Providers for Persistence
AN0341 · Windows
Behavioral correlation of privileged registry key creation under the W32Time TimeProviders path combined with a new DLL written to disk and potential process activity by LocalService. Indicates abuse of Time Providers for persistence.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Module LoadDC0016 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=7 |
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| File CreationDC0039 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 |
| Windows Registry Key ModificationDC0063 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=13, 14 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| RegistryPathScope | May need to be tuned to only monitor W32Time\TimeProviders subkey path for performance optimization |
| UserContext | Should focus on activity from administrative or SYSTEM accounts |
| TimeWindow | Controls correlation window between registry modification and DLL drop |
| DllPathEntropyThreshold | Used for anomaly scoring on DLL path patterns (e.g., random names or temp directories) |
Consider using Group Policy to configure and block additions/modifications to W32Time DLLs.
Consider using Group Policy to configure and block modifications to W32Time parameters in the Registry.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition