- Tactics
- Persistence, Privilege Escalation
- Platform
- macOS
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 24 January 2020
- Last modified
- 24 October 2025
- Contributor
- Ivan Sinyakov
Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a Launch Daemon that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at /sbin/emond will load any rules from the /etc/emond.d/rules/ directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.
Offense vs defense T1546.014
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Emond detection strategy DET0555
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Event Triggered Execution via emond on macOS
AN1534 · macOS
Detection focuses on identifying unauthorized file creation or modification within /etc/emond.d/rules/ or /private/var/db/emondClients, which indicate attempts to register a malicious emond rule. Correlate with process execution of /sbin/emond and any launched commands it invokes, especially during boot or login events. Anomalies may include rules created by non-root users or unexpected shell commands executed by emond.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | macos:unifiedlog | execution of /sbin/emond with child processes launched |
| File CreationDC0039 | macos:unifiedlog | file create or modify in /etc/emond.d/rules or /private/var/db/emondClients |
| File ModificationDC0061 | macos:unifiedlog | rule definitions written to emond rule plists |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | macos:unifiedlog | command execution triggered by emond (e.g., shell, curl, python) |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| PathPrefix | Paths such as /etc/emond.d/rules/ and /private/var/db/emondClients may vary slightly or be symlinked in some setups |
| TimeWindow | The time range for correlating rule file creation to emond execution may be tuned based on system performance and usage |
| ParentProcessFilter | Defenders may wish to restrict alerts to emond processes not spawned from trusted system update or provisioning tools |
| CommandPatternList | List of known suspicious commands or binaries used by adversaries (e.g., reverse shells, persistence scripts) |
Consider disabling emond by removing the Launch Daemon plist file.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition