tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

System Firmware T1542.001

Tactics: Persistence, Stealth
Platforms: Network Devices, Windows
Version: 2.0
Created: 19 December 2019
Last modified: 12 May 2026
Contributors: Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET; McAfee; Ryan Becwar

Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.[1][2][3]

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsNone recorded

Threat groupsNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malware57th pct

Tools & malware57th percentile · 57% of ATT&CK techniques have this many tools implementing them or fewer.

Detection rules67th pct

Detection rules67th percentile · 67% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

System Firmware MITRE reference T1542.001

57th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of tools

3 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.

LoJaxS0397 ↗

Is a UEFI BIOS rootkit deployed to persist remote access software on some targeted systems.1

created 2019-07-02MALWAREcarried by 1 group

Hacking Team UEFI RootkitS0047 ↗

Is a UEFI BIOS rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team to persist remote access software on some targeted systems.1

created 2017-05-31MALWARE

Trojan.MebromiS0001 ↗

Performs BIOS modification and can download and execute a file as well as protect itself from removal.1

created 2017-05-31MALWARE

All 3 software entries for this technique

Offense vs defense T1542.001

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 2Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 4

first rule: 2022 Q3

System Firmware detection strategy DET0099

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 2 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detection Strategy for T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware

Enterprise

2 platforms

AN0275 · Windows

Unexpected write operations to BIOS/UEFI firmware regions or EFI boot partitions that do not correlate with legitimate vendor firmware updates. API calls or utilities such as fwupdate.exe or vendor flash tools executed from non-administrative or non-IT management accounts. Suspicious raw disk writes targeting System Firmware GUID partitions followed by abnormal reboot sequences.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=4688
File CreationDC0039	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=11
Drive AccessDC0054	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=9

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
AllowedFirmwareUpdateTools	Legitimate vendor tools permitted to perform firmware flashing or BIOS updates.
TimeWindow	Expected time periods for approved firmware updates, used for correlating suspicious activity outside patch cycles.
KnownGoodFirmwareHashes	Baseline hashes of vendor BIOS/UEFI firmware for integrity comparison.

AN0276 · Network Devices

Unauthorized firmware uploads to routers, switches, or firewalls via TFTP/FTP/SCP. Logs showing boot variable or startup image path changes redirecting to non-standard firmware images. Abnormal reboots or firmware rollback attempts following configuration modification events.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Firmware ModificationDC0004	networkdevice:config	Boot image path or firmware configuration variable modified outside of maintenance windows
Drive ModificationDC0046	networkdevice:runtime	Firmware image uploaded via TFTP/FTP/SCP

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
ApprovedFirmwareHashes	Known good firmware image hashes stored for validation.
MaintenanceWindows	Expected time periods when firmware uploads or reboots are considered normal.
SourceIPWhitelist	List of trusted management IPs allowed to initiate firmware uploads.

Tests1ExecutorsPowerShell 1Need elevation1 of 1Have prerequisites0Have cleanup1Platformswindows

#	Test	Platform	Executor	Elevation	Prereqs	Cleanup	Ref
01	UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation	windows	PowerShell	Required	—	Yes
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c - http://download.microsoft.com/download/8/a/2/8a2fb72d-9b96-4e2d-a559-4a27cf905a80/windows-platform-binary-table.docx - https://github.com/tandasat/WPBT-Builder Attack command echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe" New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe" Cleanup command echo "Removing %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe" Remove-Item -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe" GUIDfb8a1dbe-9565-478a-bac4-3362958d3462

Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition

System Firmware detections T1542.001

6 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

67th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

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