Has discovered the victim environment’s protections to include Azure policies, resource locks, and Azure Storage immutability policies.1
Cloud Service Discovery T1526
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Platforms
- IaaS, Identity Provider, Office Suite, SaaS
- Version
- 1.4
- Created
- 30 August 2019
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributors
- Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team; Praetorian; Thanabodi Phrakhun, I-SECURE; Arun Seelagan, CISA
An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.
Cloud Service Discovery MITRE reference T1526
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
All 1 groups for this technique
5 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Has the ability to scan code repositories and CI/CD platforms.12
Can enumerate AWS services, such as CloudTrail and CloudWatch.1
Can enumerate Azure AD applications and service principals.1
Can enumerate information about a variety of cloud services, such as Office 365 and Sharepoint instances or OpenID Configurations.1
All 5 software entries for this technique
Offense vs defense T1526
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Cloud Service Discovery detection strategy DET0402
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Cloud Service Discovery
AN1127 · IaaS
Unusual enumeration of services and resources through cloud APIs such as AWS CLI describe-*, Azure Resource Manager queries, or GCP project listings. Defender perspective includes anomalous API calls, unexpected volume of service enumeration, and correlation of discovery with recently compromised sessions.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account MetadataDC0013 | AWS:CloudTrail | AssumeRole: Discovery actions tied to assumed identities outside of normal context |
| Cloud Service EnumerationDC0083 | AWS:CloudTrail | DescribeInstances, DescribeServices, ListFunctions: High frequency enumeration calls or unusual user agents performing discovery |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| EnumerationRateThreshold | Rate of API calls used to enumerate services; tuned to reduce noise from automated inventory tools. |
| UserAgentFilter | Expected user agents for cloud management tools; deviations may indicate adversarial tools. |
AN1128 · Identity Provider
Enumeration of directories, applications, or service principals through APIs such as Microsoft Graph or Okta API. Defender perspective includes unexpected listing of users, roles, applications, and abnormal access to identity management endpoints.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Logon Session CreationDC0067 | azure:signinlogs | InteractiveUserLogin: Discovery behavior linked to privileged logins from atypical IP ranges |
| Cloud Service EnumerationDC0083 | azure:audit | ListApplications, ListServicePrincipals: Large-scale queries against identity or application objects |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| QueryVolumeThreshold | Threshold for number of object enumeration calls before triggering detection. |
| PrivilegedRoleList | High-value identity roles (Global Admin, Application Admin) for targeted discovery monitoring. |
AN1129 · Office Suite
Discovery of SaaS services connected to productivity platforms (e.g., Microsoft 365, Google Workspace). Defender perspective includes unexpected enumeration of enabled services, API integrations, or OAuth applications tied to user accounts.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Logon Session CreationDC0067 | m365:signinlogs | UserLogin: Discovery operations shortly after account logins from new geolocations |
| Cloud Service EnumerationDC0083 | m365:unified | Get-MsolServicePrincipal, ListAppRoles: Service discovery operations executed by accounts not normally performing administrative tasks |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| MonitoredAppIntegrations | Specific Office Suite applications or plugins that may be enumerated or targeted. |
| GeoLocationDeviation | Geographic deviation threshold for discovery actions linked to recent logins. |
AN1130 · SaaS
Discovery of connected SaaS applications, APIs, or configurations within platforms like Salesforce, Slack, or Zoom. Defender perspective includes enumeration of available integrations, abnormal querying of service metadata, and follow-on attempts to exploit or persist via discovered services.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Logon Session CreationDC0067 | saas:auth | Login, TokenGranted: Discovery actions tied to anomalous login sessions or tokens |
| Cloud Service EnumerationDC0083 | saas:adminapi | ListIntegrations, ListServices: Repeated service discovery requests from accounts without administrative responsibilities |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| IntegrationDiscoveryThreshold | Number of SaaS integrations enumerated before triggering detection. |
| ServiceAccountScope | Expected permissions for service accounts to distinguish benign from malicious discovery. |
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition