tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

Reflection Amplification T1498.002

sub-technique of T1498 Network Denial of Service

Tactic: Impact
Platforms: Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS
Version: 1.4
Created: 02 March 2020
Last modified: 24 October 2025

Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target.[1] This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network.

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsNone recorded

Threat groupsNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malwareNone recorded

Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Detection rules42nd pct

Detection rules42nd percentile · 58% of ATT&CK techniques have more detection rules written.

Offense vs defense T1498.002

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 0Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 1

first rule: 2020 Q2

Reflection Amplification detection strategy DET0408

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detection Strategy for Reflection Amplification DoS (T1498.002)

Enterprise

4 platforms

AN1140 · Windows

Outbound spoofed traffic to known amplification protocols (e.g., DNS, NTP, Memcached) combined with abnormal network traffic volume targeting remote reflectors, resulting in disproportionate traffic returned to a victim

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Host StatusDC0018	Windows:perfmon	Sudden spike in outbound throughput without corresponding inbound traffic
Network Connection CreationDC0082	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=3, 22

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
TimeWindow	Interval for measuring sudden outbound spike or volume pattern
AmplificationProtocolPorts	List of known ports used for reflection amplification (e.g., 53/DNS, 123/NTP, 11211/Memcached)
PacketToByteRatio	Heuristic threshold where the response volume far outweighs the request volume

AN1141 · Linux

Spoofed outbound packets sent to amplification services from command-line tools or scripts, combined with abnormal outbound packet volume on known reflector ports

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Host StatusDC0018	sar:network	Outbound network saturation with minimal process activity
Command ExecutionDC0064	auditd:SYSCALL	Execution of spoofing tools (e.g., hping3, nping, scapy) sending UDP packets to known amplifier ports
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	NSM:Flow	Outbound UDP floods targeting common reflection services with spoofed IP headers

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
TimeWindow	Sliding interval for detecting volumetric anomalies
AmplificationProtocolList	Which protocols to watch (e.g., DNS, NTP, SSDP, Memcached)
ExecutionToolList	Set of binaries and scripts commonly abused for spoofing/reflection

AN1142 · macOS

Command-line initiated UDP traffic bursts to external reflection amplification ports using built-in scripting or binaries with network anomalies

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	macos:unifiedlog	Execution of ping, nping, or crafted network packets via bash or python to reflection services
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	macos:unifiedlog	Outbound UDP spikes to external reflector IPs

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
ReflectionPorts	Ports known for reflection abuse — DNS, NTP, SSDP, Memcached
TrafficSpikeThreshold	How much deviation in outbound traffic constitutes a suspicious spike

AN1143 · IaaS

Cloud-hosted VM or container generates spoofed UDP requests to third-party services on known amplifier ports, with high outbound-to-inbound traffic ratios in VPC Flow Logs

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Host StatusDC0018	AWS:CloudWatch	Sudden spike in network output without a corresponding inbound request ratio
Firewall Rule ModificationDC0051	AWS:CloudTrail	Create egress rule allowing UDP to port 53, 123, 11211
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	AWS:VPCFlowLogs	Large outbound UDP traffic to multiple public reflector IPs

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
EgressRulePorts	Cloud security group rules permitting UDP to reflector protocols
OutboundToInboundRatio	Ratio threshold to flag traffic as potential reflection behavior
VMInstanceTagContext	Cloud metadata that can help scope anomalous behavior to development, testing, or external-facing services

Reflection Amplification detections T1498.002

1 rule is mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

42nd pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

(none) 1

Severity

Library

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