Direct Network Flood T1498.001
- Tactic
- Impact
- Platforms
- Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS
- Version
- 1.4
- Created
- 02 March 2020
- Last modified
- 24 October 2025
Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. Direct Network Floods are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.
Offense vs defense T1498.001
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
Direct Network Flood detection strategy DET0343
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Direct Network Flood Detection across IaaS, Linux, Windows, and macOS
AN0969 · Windows
High-volume packet generation by local processes (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, curl.exe) or network service processes resulting in excessive outbound traffic over short time window, correlated with abnormal resource usage or degraded host responsiveness.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4688 |
| Network Connection CreationDC0082 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=3, 22 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| PacketRateThreshold | Defines the burst threshold (e.g., 10,000 pps) above which activity should be flagged as anomalous. |
| TimeWindow | Duration over which to aggregate and analyze flow volume. |
AN0970 · Linux
Kernel or userland processes generating high-rate network traffic (ICMP, UDP, TCP SYN) beyond expected interface throughput or user behavior norms.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | auditd:SYSCALL | execve |
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | auditd:SYSCALL | connect or sendto system call with burst pattern |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| SyscallBurstCount | Threshold of repeated socket calls within a short interval indicating flood behavior. |
| UserContext | Restrict to non-admin user traffic unless elevated access is detected. |
AN0971 · macOS
Excessive outbound traffic via ping, curl, or custom scripts indicating flooding behavior, especially with no UI context or user interaction.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | macos:unifiedlog | process created with repeated ICMP or UDP flood behavior |
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | macos:unifiedlog | sudden burst in outgoing packets from same PID |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| BurstTimeWindow | Tunable range (e.g., 15s, 30s) for detecting packet floods. |
AN0972 · IaaS
VM or cloud instance generating anomalously high network egress targeting same destination IP or service, especially using stateless protocols.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Host StatusDC0018 | AWS:CloudWatch | NetworkOut spike beyond baseline |
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | AWS:VPCFlowLogs | source instance sends large volume of traffic in short window |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| InstanceTrafficThreshold | Alert when egress exceeds normal usage by X%. |
| ProtocolType | Prioritize alerts on stateless protocols such as UDP and ICMP. |
When flood volumes exceed the capacity of the network connection being targeted, it is typically necessary to intercept the incoming traffic upstream to filter out the attack traffic from the legitimate traffic. Such defenses can be provided by the hosting Internet Service Provider (ISP) or by a 3rd party such as a Content Delivery Network (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations. Depending on flood volume, on-premises filtering may be possible by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport. As immediate response may require rapid engagement of 3rd parties, analyze the risk associated to critical resources being affected by Network DoS attacks and create a disaster recovery plan/business continuity plan to respond to incidents.