tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

Time Based Checks T1497.003

sub-technique of T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Tactics: Stealth, Discovery
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Version: 3.0
Created: 06 March 2020
Last modified: 12 May 2026
Contributors: Deloitte Threat Library Team; Jeff Felling, Red Canary; Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE; Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101

Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock.

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsNone recorded

Threat groupsNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Campaigns72nd pct

Campaigns72nd percentile · 72% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.

Tools & malwareTop 8%

Tools & malware92nd percentile · 92% of ATT&CK techniques have this many tools implementing them or fewer.

Detection rules54th pct

Detection rules54th percentile · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

Time Based Checks MITRE reference T1497.003

72nd pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of campaigns

1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.

Operation Dream JobC0022 ↗

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that collected GetTickCount and GetSystemTimeAsFileTime data to detect sandbox or VMware services.1

2019–2020

All 1 campaigns for this technique

Offense vs defense T1497.003

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 1Sigma rules (cumulative) · 0Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 3

first rule: 2021 Q3 · 1 of 1 campaigns plotted

Time Based Checks detection strategy DET0141

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detect Time-Based Evasion via Sleep, Timer Loops, and Delayed Execution

Enterprise

3 platforms

AN0396 · Windows

Process creation involving suspicious delays (e.g., Sleep, ping -n loops, WaitForSingleObject), followed by sensitive system access or lateral movement behaviors.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Module LoadDC0016	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=7
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=1

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
SleepDurationThreshold	Defines maximum allowable sleep duration in milliseconds before triggering anomaly detection.
TimeBetweenExecutionAndNextStage	Temporal window between initial process and next stage (e.g., lateral movement or persistence), used to correlate dormant activity.
UserContext	Whether the activity occurs in SYSTEM or user context may affect legitimacy scoring.

AN0397 · Linux

Script-based execution of sleep loops or time delay commands (e.g., sleep, ping delay, while-loops) followed by file creation or network connections.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	auditd:SYSCALL	execve of sleep or ping command within script interpreted by bash/python
File MetadataDC0059	auditd:SYSCALL	file write after sleep delay

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
SleepLoopCount	Defines how many loop iterations or sleep cycles are considered anomalous in the monitored environment.
ExecutionScriptType	Identifies which scripting interpreter is used (e.g., bash, python, perl) to adjust detection logic.

AN0398 · macOS

Use of usleep, nanosleep, or NSTimer calls in executables or binaries with no GUI interaction, especially followed by disk/network activity.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
OS API ExecutionDC0021	macos:unifiedlog	application logs referencing NSTimer, sleep, or launchd delays
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=1

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
AppBundleIdentifier	Correlate with known/expected signed apps vs. unsigned binaries to reduce noise.
TimeToNextEvent	Minimum time expected between process start and observable I/O for normal apps.

Tests1Executorssh 1Need elevation0 of 1Have prerequisites0Have cleanup0Platformslinux, macos

Test

Platform

Executor

Elevation

Prereqs

Cleanup

Ref

Delay execution with ping

linux, macos

—

Uses the ping command to introduce a delay before executing a malicious payload.

Input arguments

Name	Type	Default	Description
ping_count	integer	250	Number of ping requests to send (higher counts increase the delay)
evil_command	string	whoami	Command to run after the delay

Attack command

ping -c #{ping_count} 8.8.8.8 > /dev/null
#{evil_command}

GUID0ba7fd81-83bb-4620-b33f-1baa342d8845

Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition

Time Based Checks detections T1497.003

3 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

54th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

Severity

Library

Drag headers to reorder | Drag edges to resize

Loading detections...

Select	Title	Description	Category	Status	Event	Product	MITRE ATT&CK	CVEs	Severity	Author	Created	Updated	ID	Refs