Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion T1485.001
- Tactic
- Impact
- Platform
- IaaS
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 25 September 2024
- Last modified
- 15 April 2025
Adversaries may modify the lifecycle policies of a cloud storage bucket to destroy all objects stored within.
Offense vs defense T1485.001
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion detection strategy DET0041
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Lifecycle Policy Modifications for Triggered Deletion in IaaS Cloud Storage
AN0117 · IaaS
Adversary with write access to storage modifies lifecycle policies (e.g., via PutBucketLifecycle) to schedule rapid object deletion across one or more storage buckets. This is often used to trigger impact (destruction), remove logs (defense evasion), or force extortion (ransomware).
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud Storage ModificationDC0023 | AWS:CloudTrail | PutBucketLifecycle, PutLifecycleConfiguration, SetBucketLifecycle, storage.buckets.update |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| LifecycleExpirationDays | Policy values setting Expiration in fewer than N days (e.g., 0–1) are highly suspicious. |
| TargetBucket | Filter by bucket types (e.g., log storage, production DB snapshots) to prioritize detection. |
| Principal | Correlate rare or anomalous IAM principals making destructive lifecycle changes. |
| TimeWindow | Link lifecycle policy change with API activity suggesting staged deletion or extortion attempt. |
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data. Ensure backups are stored off system and protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery.
In cloud environments, limit permissions to modify cloud bucket lifecycle policies (e.g., PutLifecycleConfiguration in AWS) to only those accounts that require it. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control policies to limit the use of the PutBucketLifecycle API call.