tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

MMC T1218.014

sub-technique of T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution

Tactic: Stealth
Platform: Windows
Version: 3.0
Created: 28 September 2021
Last modified: 12 May 2026
Contributor: Wes Hurd

Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.[1][2] MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.[3]

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groups45th pct

Threat groups45th percentile · 55% of ATT&CK techniques have more threat groups attributed.

Campaigns72nd pct

Campaigns72nd percentile · 72% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.

Tools & malwareNone recorded

Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Detection rules71st pct

Detection rules71st percentile · 71% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

MMC MITRE reference T1218.014

45th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups

1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.

Medusa GroupG1051 ↗

Has leveraged Microsoft Management Console (MMC) to facilitate lateral movement and to interact locally or remotely with victim devices using the command mmc.exe compmgmt.msc /computer:{hostname/ip}.1

created 2025-10-151 reference

All 1 groups for this technique

Offense vs defense T1218.014

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 1Sigma rules (cumulative) · 2Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 6

first rule: 2021 Q3 · 1 of 1 campaigns plotted

MMC detection strategy DET0222

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detecting MMC (.msc) Proxy Execution and Malicious COM Activation

Enterprise

1 platform

AN0622 · Windows

Abuse of mmc.exe to execute non-Microsoft or user-staged .msc files and malicious COM CLSIDs. Behavioral chain: (1) suspicious mmc.exe invocation with /a or -Embedding and non-standard .msc path → (2) COM activation of non-baseline CLSIDs by mmc.exe → (3) mmc.exe loads non-baseline DLLs (user-writable/UNC/unsigned) → (4) optional network/DNS activity from mmc.exe.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Module LoadDC0016	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=7
OS API ExecutionDC0021	WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-COM/Operational	CLSID activation events where ProcessName=mmc.exe and CLSID not in allowed baseline
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=1
File CreationDC0039	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=11
Windows Registry Key CreationDC0056	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=12
Windows Registry Key ModificationDC0063	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=13, 14
Command ExecutionDC0064	WinEventLog:PowerShell	EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106
Network Connection CreationDC0082	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=3, 22

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
TimeWindow	Correlation window (e.g., 5–10 minutes) tying .msc creation → mmc.exe start → module loads → COM/net activity.
AllowedMSCList	Set of Microsoft-supplied .msc names/paths allowed in the environment to suppress noise.
SuspiciousMSCPathRegex	Regex for user-writable and network paths indicating risky .msc staging (Users, AppData, Downloads, Desktop, UNC).
AllowedCLSIDs	Baseline of CLSIDs expected to be activated by mmc.exe; alert on unknown/new.
ParentProcessAllowList	Expected parents for mmc.exe (explorer.exe, services) vs. unusual (powershell, wscript, office apps).
SignedToUnsignedTransition	Flag when signed mmc.exe results in loading unsigned DLLs.
ExternalIPAllowlist	Approved external ranges/domains to exclude when mmc.exe makes network requests.

MMC detections T1218.014

8 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

71st pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

Severity

Library

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