SyncAppvPublishingServer T1216.002
- Tactic
- Stealth
- Platform
- Windows
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 06 February 2024
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributor
- Shaul Vilkomir-Preisman
Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to proxy execution of malicious PowerShell commands. SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs is a Visual Basic script associated with how Windows virtualizes applications (Microsoft Application Virtualization, or App-V).[1] For example, Windows may render Win32 applications to users as virtual applications, allowing users to launch and interact with them as if they were installed locally.[2][3]
The SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script is legitimate, may be signed by Microsoft, and is commonly executed from \System32 through the command line via wscript.exe.[4][5]
Offense vs defense T1216.002
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
SyncAppvPublishingServer detection strategy DET0440
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detecting PowerShell Execution via SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs Proxy Abuse
AN1220 · Windows
Execution of SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs through wscript.exe with a command-line containing embedded PowerShell, proxying malicious PowerShell execution through a Microsoft-signed VBScript interpreter to evade detection and restrictions.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Module LoadDC0016 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=7 |
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| Process AccessDC0035 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=10 |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | WinEventLog:PowerShell | EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| CommandLineRegex | Detects embedded PowerShell commands in SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs invocation, e.g., {powershell -nop -enc ...} |
| ScriptInterpreter | May vary between wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or called via cmd.exe |
| PowerShellObfuscationScore | Used to detect encoding, obfuscation, or entropy level in embedded PowerShell payloads |
| TimeWindow | Time delta between VBScript proxy invocation and PowerShell payload execution |
Certain signed scripts that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application control configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition