Has exfiltrated stored emails from compromised hosts.1
- Tactic
- Collection
- Platform
- Windows
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 19 February 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files.
Local Email Collection MITRE reference T1114.001
8 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Collected email archives from victim environments.1
Has collected emails to use in future phishing campaigns.1
Delivered malicious JavaScript payloads capable of exfiltrating email messages from exploited email servers.1
Has harvested data from victim's e-mail including through execution of <code>wmic /node:<ip> process call create "cmd /c copy c:\Users\<username>\<path>\backup.pst c:\windows\temp\backup.pst" copy "i:\<path>\<username>\My Documents\<filename>.pst" copy</code>.1
Has collected documents from victims' email accounts.1
All 8 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
During Night Dragon, threat actors used RAT malware to exfiltrate email archives.1
All 1 campaigns for this technique
11 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can capture the recipients of sent email messages from compromised accounts.1
Can target and steal locally stored emails to support thread hijacking phishing campaigns.123
Can parse e-mails on a target machine.1
Can harvest data from mail clients.1
Has been observed leveraging a module that scrapes email data from Outlook.1
Has the ability to collect emails on a target system.1
All 11 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1114.001
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Local Email Collection detection strategy DET0047
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detect Local Email Collection via Outlook Data File Access and Command Line Tooling
AN0130 · Windows
Detection focuses on processes that attempt to locate, access, or exfiltrate local Outlook data files (.pst/.ost) using file system access, native Windows utilities (e.g., PowerShell, WMI), or remote access tools with file browsing capabilities. The behavior chain includes directory enumeration, file access, optional compression or staging, and network transfer.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| File CreationDC0039 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 |
| File AccessDC0055 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656 |
| Network Connection CreationDC0082 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=3, 22 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TargetFilePathPattern | Regex or wildcard patterns for sensitive Outlook file paths (.ost/.pst) depending on organizational deployment. |
| TimeWindow | Timeframe used to correlate related file access, process creation, and exfiltration events. |
| UserContext | Limit detection to user accounts not normally interacting with Outlook file locations (e.g., service accounts, low-privileged users). |
| ProcessAllowList | Filter known legitimate Outlook-accessing processes to reduce false positives. |
Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.
Implement secure out-of-band alerts to notify security teams of unusual local email activities, such as mass forwarding or large attachments being sent, indicating potential data exfiltration attempts.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition