Granted compromised email accounts read access to the email boxes of additional targeted accounts. The group then was able to authenticate to the intended victim's OWA (Outlook Web Access) portal and read hundreds of email communications for information on Middle East organizations.1
Additional Email Delegate Permissions T1098.002
- Tactics
- Persistence, Privilege Escalation
- Platforms
- Windows, Office Suite
- Version
- 2.2
- Created
- 19 January 2020
- Last modified
- 24 October 2025
- Contributors
- Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART); Mike Burns, Mandiant; Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC); Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security; Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul); Naveen Vijayaraghavan
Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account.
Additional Email Delegate Permissions MITRE reference T1098.002
3 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has used a compromised global administrator account in Azure AD to backdoor a service principal with ApplicationImpersonation rights to start collecting emails from targeted mailboxes; APT29 has also used compromised accounts holding ApplicationImpersonation rights in Exchange to collect emails.12
Has used a Powershell cmdlet to grant the ApplicationImpersonation role to a compromised account.1
All 3 groups for this technique
2 campaigns have been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
During HomeLand Justice, threat actors added the ApplicationImpersonation management role to accounts under their control to impersonate users and take ownership of targeted mailboxes.1
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 added their own devices as allowed IDs for active sync using Set-CASMailbox, allowing it to obtain copies of victim mailboxes. It also added additional permissions (such as Mail.Read and Mail.ReadWrite) to compromised Application or Service Principals.123
All 2 campaigns for this technique
Offense vs defense T1098.002
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Additional Email Delegate Permissions detection strategy DET0373
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 2 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Addition of Email Delegate Permissions
AN1051 · Office Suite
Detection of anomalous or unauthorized mailbox delegation activity (e.g., Add-MailboxPermission, Default/Anonymous mailbox permissions, Gmail delegation setup).
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account ModificationDC0010 | m365:unified | Add-MailboxPermission, UpdateFolderPermissions |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| DelegatePermissionLevel | Threshold for unexpected delegate roles such as FullAccess or SendAs. |
| FolderTargetScope | Mailbox folder targeted by delegation (Inbox, Root, Calendar, etc.). |
| DelegatorToDelegatePairing | Pairings of delegate and delegator users that are expected. |
| MailflowAnomalyThreshold | Spike in outbound mail after delegate addition, used to catch phishing or mass exfil. |
AN1052 · Windows
Execution of PowerShell commands that modify mailbox permissions using Exchange cmdlets (e.g., Add-MailboxPermission), often tied to BEC or post-compromise persistence.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4688 |
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | m365:unified | PowerShell: Add-MailboxPermission |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| PowerShellCmdletFilter | Exchange cmdlets to include or exclude based on scope (e.g., Add-MailboxPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission). |
| ExecutionParent | Flag suspicious script or interactive shell launch by non-admins. |
| TimeWindow | Window in which Add-MailboxPermission is followed by anomalous usage (e.g., SendAs events). |
If email delegation is not required, disable it. In Google Workspace this can be accomplished through the Google Admin console.
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts.
Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition