Shane Tully, @securitygypsy; Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank; Tamir Yehuda
Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.
Access to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
SaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad Cloud Administration Command on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Entra ID.[1] Such services may also utilize Web Protocols to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.[2]
Network infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.[3]
The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.
Top 21%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
8 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has leveraged legitimate built-in features of cloud-based management platforms to include mobile device management (MDM) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) solutions.12VOID MANTICORE has also initiated built-in remote wipe instructions using a privileged account within Microsoft Intune.12
Has leveraged legitimate software tools such as AntiVirus Agents, Security Services, and App Development tools to execute scripts and to side-load dlls.12
During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network.1
2022
All 1 campaigns for this technique
1 software entry is documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
It is believed that a patch management system for an anti-virus product commonly installed among targeted companies was used to distribute the Wiper malware.1
created 2017-05-31MALWARE
All 1 software entries for this technique
Offense vs defense T1072
Compare defenses against adversary use. Eight counts, ranking this technique against the entire ATT&CK Enterprise matrix. Attack sits left, defense right.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 5 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Adversary Abuse of Software Deployment Tools
Enterprise
5 platforms
AN0623 · Windows
Detects SCCM, Intune, or remote push execution spawning scripts or binaries from SYSTEM context or unusual consoles (e.g., cmtrace.exe launching PowerShell or cmd.exe).
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
ParentImageList
Allowlist of known SCCM-related binary spawners (e.g., 'CCMExec.exe')
UserContext
Expected deployment activity from scheduled system accounts
TimeWindow
Unusual deployment timing outside standard maintenance hours
AN0624 · Linux
Detects remote scripts or binaries deployed via Puppet, Chef, Ansible, or shell scripts from orchestration servers executing outside maintenance windows or in unmanaged nodes.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
DeployingHostAllowList
Approved orchestration or jump box IPs
ScriptExecutionBaseline
Expected scripts, interpreters, or package managers used
AN0625 · macOS
Detects script or binary execution initiated via JAMF, Munki, or custom MDM agents outside of baseline, or JAMF launching new Terminal or osascript processes from remote command payloads.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
IAMRoleAllowList
Approved deployment administrators or service accounts
ExecutionTargetList
Expected endpoints targeted by SaaS deployments
AN0627 · Network Devices
Detects central router or switch config management tools (e.g., FortiManager, Cisco Prime) triggering device reboots or config pushes using abnormal accounts or IPs.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
If the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.
Ensure that any accounts used by third-party providers to access these systems are traceable to the third-party and are not used throughout the network or used by other third-party providers in the same environment. Ensure there are regular reviews of accounts provisioned to these systems to verify continued business need, and ensure there is governance to trace de-provisioning of access that is no longer required. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of account privilege separation.
72nd pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules
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Microsoft Intune device remediation scripts are a tool administrators can use to remotely manage devices, this functionality can also be abused for SYSTEM level code execution and lateral movement to intune managed devices. (...)
Microsoft Intune device management configuration policies are a tool administrators can use to remotely manage policies and settings on intune managed devices. (...)
Microsoft Intune device management configuration policies, scripts & apps are a all tools administrators can use to remotely manage intune managed devices. (...)
Microsoft Intune supports deploying packaged applications to support software deployment, this functionality can also be abused for deploying malicious payloads to intune managed devices. (...)