tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

Publish/Subscribe Protocols T1071.005

sub-technique of T1071 Application Layer Protocol

Tactic: Command and Control
Platforms: macOS, Linux, Windows, Network Devices
Version: 1.1
Created: 28 August 2024
Last modified: 15 April 2025
Contributors: Domenico Mazzaferro Palmeri; Sofia Sanchez Margolles

Adversaries may communicate using publish/subscribe (pub/sub) application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsNone recorded

Threat groupsNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malware44th pct

Tools & malware44th percentile · 56% of ATT&CK techniques have more tools implementing them.

Detection rulesNone recorded

Detection rulesNone recorded · 33% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Publish/Subscribe Protocols MITRE reference T1071.005

44th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of tools

1 software entry is documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.

GLOOXMAILS0026 ↗

Communicates to servers operated by Google using the Jabber/XMPP protocol for C2.1

created 2017-05-31MALWAREcarried by 1 group

All 1 software entries for this technique

Offense vs defense T1071.005

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

Publish/Subscribe Protocols detection strategy DET0002

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Behavioral Detection of Publish/Subscribe Protocol Misuse for C2

Enterprise

4 platforms

AN0002 · Windows

Detects non-standard processes (e.g., PowerShell, python.exe, rundll32.exe) making outbound connections using publish/subscribe protocols (e.g., MQTT, AMQP) over non-browser, encrypted channels, often beaconing to message brokers.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Network Connection CreationDC0082	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=3, 22
Network Traffic ContentDC0085	NSM:Flow	mqtt.log / xmpp.log (custom log feeds)

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
UnusualProcessList	Detect suspicious processes initiating outbound pub/sub connections
TimeWindow	Define beaconing interval used for temporal correlation
ProtocolPortList	Custom MQTT/XMPP port use in non-standard ranges (e.g., 1883, 5222, 5672)

AN0003 · Linux

Detects CLI tools (e.g., mosquitto_pub, nc, python scripts) interacting with pub/sub brokers using unusual topic names, high-frequency publication rates, or obfuscated payloads to non-standard hosts.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	auditd:SYSCALL	execve
Network Traffic ContentDC0085	NSM:Flow	mqtt.log or AMQP custom log

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
BrokerAllowList	Known-good brokers used by approved apps and daemons
TopicAnomalyScore	Payload length, entropy, or topic name patterns

AN0004 · macOS

Detects osascript, curl, or custom binaries interacting with XMPP/MQTT brokers in unapproved destinations with encrypted payloads or frequent POST-like requests to broker URIs.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	macos:unifiedlog	log stream 'eventMessage contains pubsub or broker'
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	macos:osquery	socket_events

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
AppContextFilter	Applications not known to use pub/sub protocols
URIPathRegex	Custom path patterns to message brokers over HTTPS

AN0005 · Network Devices

Detects pub/sub traffic over unusual ports, high-frequency topic publications, and connections to known-bad or dynamic broker endpoints outside allowlisted infrastructure.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Network Traffic ContentDC0085	NSM:Flow	mqtt.log, xmpp.log, amqp.log

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
BrokerReputationList	Dynamic blocklist or threat intel feed for C2 brokers
PayloadLengthThreshold	Exfil-style long topic messages vs telemetry-style short messages

Publish/Subscribe Protocols detections T1071.005

No detection rules are mapped to this technique yet.

None recorded— 33% of ATT&CK techniques have none either

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