Gamaredon GroupG0047 ↗
Has used obfuscated VBScripts with randomly generated variable names and concatenated strings.1
tfMITRE ATT&CK technique
Data Obfuscation T1001
- Tactic
- Command and Control
- Platforms
- ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows
- Version
- 1.2
- Created
- 31 May 2017
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
Sub-techniques 35 rules across the family · 2 mapped directly to T1001 · 1 of 3 carry rules
Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect.[1] Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols.
ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact
1
Threat groups45th pct
Threat groups45th percentile · 55% of ATT&CK techniques have more threat groups attributed.1
Campaigns72nd pct
Campaigns72nd percentile · 72% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.13
Tools & malwareTop 23%
Tools & malware77th percentile · 77% of ATT&CK techniques have this many tools implementing them or fewer.2
Detection rules50th pct
Detection rules50th percentile · 50% of ATT&CK techniques have more detection rules written.Data Obfuscation MITRE reference T1001
45th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
All 1 groups for this technique
1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
Operation WocaoC0014 ↗
During Operation Wocao, threat actors encrypted IP addresses used for "Agent" proxy hops with RC4.1
All 1 campaigns for this technique
13 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
evilginx2S9003 ↗
Can modify the Origin and Referrer fields in HTTPS headers it relays between intended victims and legitimate websites to comply with cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) restrictions.1
SystemBCS9001 ↗
Has encoded with XOR and encrypted with RC4 its beacon.1
StrelaStealerS1183 ↗
Encrypts the payload of HTTP POST communications using the same XOR key used for the malware's DLL payload.1
FRAMESTINGS1120 ↗
Can send and receive zlib compressed data within POST requests.1
DarkGateS1111 ↗
Will retrieved encrypted commands from its command and control server for follow-on actions such as cryptocurrency mining.1
NinjaS1100 ↗
Has the ability to modify headers and URL paths to hide malicious traffic in HTTP requests.1
All 13 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1001
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Range
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 0Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 2
first rule: 2026 Q2 · 0 of 1 campaigns plotted (Operation Wocao (dated 2017) falls before the 2023 window)Data Obfuscation detection strategy DET0053
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detect Obfuscated C2 via Network Traffic Analysis
3 platforms
AN0144 · Windows
Detects excessive outbound traffic to remote host over HTTP(S) from uncommon or previously unseen processes.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic ContentDC0085 | NSM:Flow | HTTP |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| OutboundByteThreshold | Defines threshold ratio of outbound to inbound bytes that signals possible obfuscation |
| ProcessAllowlist | List of known legitimate network clients to exclude from anomaly checks |
AN0145 · Linux
Identifies custom or previously unseen userland processes initiating high-volume HTTP connections with low response volume.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Network Connection CreationDC0082 | auditd:SYSCALL | connect |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| UserProcessBaseline | Defines what is considered abnormal for a user-initiated process context |
AN0146 · macOS
Flags unexpected user applications initiating long-lived HTTP(S) sessions with irregular traffic patterns.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | macos:unifiedlog | process |
| Network Traffic ContentDC0085 | macos:unifiedlog | network flow |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| SessionDuration | Session length that exceeds average per-user expectations |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate some obfuscation activity at the network level.