CLAIMLOADER is a malware variant that frequently accompanies legitimate executables that are used for DLL side-loading known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2021.[1][2]
11
Techniques51st pct
4
Tactics32nd pct
1
Threat groupunranked
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
CLAIMLOADER has imitated legitimate software directories through the creation and storage of the EXE and DLL in C:\ProgramData\ and the use of legitimate looking names of software.5
CLAIMLOADER has created scheduled tasks that execute the loader every five(5) minutes using schtasks /F /Create /TN \"<fake_software_name>\" /SC minute /MO 5 /TR
\"C:\\ProgramData\\<path_to_exe> <hardcoded_argument>\.6
CLAIMLOADER has used various Windows API calls during execution, when establishing persistence and defense evasion.78CLAIMLOADER has also leveraged the legitimate API functions to run its shellcode through the callback function, including GetDC() and EnumFontsW().7CLAIMLOADER established persistence by utilizing the API SHSetValue().7CLAIMLOADER has utilized APIs with callback functions such as EnumpropsExW, EnumSystemLanguageGroupsA, and EnumCalendarInfoExW.8
CLAIMLOADER has used tailored decoy documents as part of the installation routine to entice users to open attachments.14
Execution66 detection rules
Standing S1236
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques1151st pct
51st percentile · 51% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics432nd pct
32nd percentile · 68% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat group161% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique20med47th pct
47th percentile · 53% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique7med
CLAIMLOADER detections S1236
376 distinct rules cover the 11 techniques recorded for this malware. 291 Sigma · 85 Splunk.
9 covered by at least one rule2 with no coverage376 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 300+ rules
Drag headers to reorder | Drag edges to resize
Select
Title
Description
Category
Status
Event
OS
Product
MITRE ATT&CK
CVEs
Severity
Author
Created
Updated
ID
Refs
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
The following analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, privilege escalation, password dumping or data exfiltration. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of a batch file (.bat) within the Windows system directory tree, specifically in the System32 or SysWOW64 folders. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of CertUtil.exe with the 'decode' argument, which may indicate an attempt to decode a previously encoded file, potentially containing malicious payloads. (...)
Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split), wagga (name)
2019-10-25
2025-10-22
f59c3faf-50f3-464b-9f4c-1b67ab512d99
Detects creation of specific system DLL files that are usually not present on the system (or at least not in system directories) but may be loaded by legitimate processes. (...)
Detects modifications to the "Hidden" and "ShowSuperHidden" explorer registry values in order to disable showing of hidden files and system files. (...)