T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations. [1][2]
13
Techniques57th pct
6
Tactics53rd pct
0
Threat groupsNone recorded
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
T9000 gathers and beacons the username of the logged in account during installation. It will also gather the username of running processes to determine if it is running as SYSTEM.4
T9000 searches removable storage devices for files with a pre-defined list of file extensions (e.g. * .doc, *.ppt, *.xls, *.docx, *.pptx, *.xlsx). Any matching files are encrypted and written to a local user directory.7
T9000 searches through connected drives for removable storage devices.8
Discovery2 detection rules
Standing S0098
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques1357th pct
57th percentile · 57% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics653rd pct
53rd percentile · 53% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many tactics spanned or fewer.
Threat groups061% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique9medBottom 13%
13th percentile · 87% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique6med55th pct
55th percentile · 55% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many atomic tests per technique or fewer.
Data comps / technique4med54% tie · 11 values
54% of the population shares a single value across only 11 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Mitigations / technique0medBottom 17%
17th percentile · 83% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more mitigations per technique.
5 of 8 axes carry an honest rank on this page. Coverage medians are taken across this malware’s 13 Enterprise techniques.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
The following analytic identifies the execution of the "whoami" command with the "/group" flag, where the results are passed to the "find" command in order to look for a the string "12288". (...)
This analytic detects potential reconnaissance activities on Cisco ASA devices by identifying execution of multiple information-gathering "show" commands within a short timeframe. (...)
Detects creation of specific system DLL files that are usually not present on the system (or at least not in system directories) but may be loaded by legitimate processes. (...)
The following analytic identifies specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that indicate reconnaissance attempts to find vulnerable JBoss servers. (...)
Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "storage" flag in order to retrieve information about the storage status and other related information. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments invoking the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of the `GetCurrent` method from the WindowsIdentity .NET class using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). (...)