During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary tasked Claude Code to automatically gather sensitive data stored within the local system to include credentials, system configurations and sensitive operational data.3
campaign
Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign C0062
- First seen
- September 2025
- Last seen
- September 2025
- Created
- 20 April 2026
- Last modified
- 31 July 2026
The Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign was conducted in September 2025 by a likely China nexus espionage actor identified as GTG-1002. The Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign was a highly coordinated operation that manipulated Claude Code to perform reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploitation, lateral movement, credential harvesting, data analysis, and exfiltration operations at approximately 30 entities in the technology, financial, chemical, and government sectors. During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, human operators used Claude Code agents and Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools to automate cyber operations. Operators broke attacks into discrete tasks, used crafted prompts, and established personas to bypass AI guardrails, enabling the agents to execute the operations with minimal human involvement.[1][2]
26
TechniquesTop 23%
10
Tactics68th pct
0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
0
Threat groupsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
MITRE reference C0062
During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary configured Claude Code to identify and gather system configurations of discovered devices.4
During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to enumerate internal network services and endpoints across targeted environments using browser automation via MCP, including databases, container registries, admin interfaces, and workflow orchestration platforms.5
During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to map internal network architecture and access relationships.6
During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to stage extracted data and operational documentation in structured markdown files on local systems prior to exfiltration.7
During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used harvested credentials to authenticate against internal APIs, database systems, container registries, and logging infrastructure across targeted networks.8
Standing C0062
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this campaign touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 56 ATT&CK campaigns only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques26Top 23%
77th percentile · 77% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics1068th pct
68th percentile · 68% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have this many tactics spanned or fewer.
Tools & malware0Bottom 11%
11th percentile · 89% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more tools and malware.
Threat groups055% tie · 3 values
55% of the population shares a single value across only 3 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique12med38th pct
38th percentile · 62% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique0med
Detection coverage C0062
647 distinct rules cover the 26 techniques recorded for this campaign. The 702 technique-to-rule mappings resolve to 647 distinct rules, because one rule can cover several techniques. 404 Sigma · 243 Splunk.
20 covered by at least one rule6 with no coverage647 distinct rules in total
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