KV Botnet Activity gathers victim IP information during initial installation stages.3
campaign
KV Botnet Activity C0035
- First seen
- October 2022
- Last seen
- January 2024
- Created
- 10 June 2024
- Last modified
- 31 July 2026
KV Botnet Activity consisted of exploitation of primarily “end-of-life” small office-home office (SOHO) equipment from manufacturers such as Cisco, NETGEAR, and DrayTek. KV Botnet Activity was used by Volt Typhoon to obfuscate connectivity to victims in multiple critical infrastructure segments, including energy and telecommunication companies and entities based on the US territory of Guam. While the KV Botnet is the most prominent element of this campaign, it overlaps with another botnet cluster referred to as the JDY cluster.[1] This botnet was disrupted by US law enforcement entities in early 2024 after periods of activity from October 2022 through January 2024.[2]
20
Techniques57th pct
8
Tactics48th pct
0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
1
Threat groupunranked
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
MITRE reference C0035
KV Botnet Activity involves changing process filename to pr_set_mm_exe_file and process name to pr_set_name during later infection stages.4
KV Botnet Activity installation steps include first identifying, then stopping, any process containing [kworker\/0:1], then renaming its initial installation stage to this process name.5
KV Botnet Activity final payload installation includes mounting and binding to the \/proc\/ filepath on the victim system to enable subsequent operation in memory while also removing on-disk artifacts.6
Scripts associated with KV Botnet Activity initial deployment can identify processes related to security tools and other botnet families for follow-on disabling during installation.7
KV Botnet Activity utilizes multiple Bash scripts during botnet installation stages, and the final botnet payload allows for running commands in the Bash shell.8
Standing C0035
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this campaign touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 56 ATT&CK campaigns only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques2057th pct
57th percentile · 57% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics848th pct
48th percentile · 52% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more tactics spanned.
Tools & malware0Bottom 11%
11th percentile · 89% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more tools and malware.
Threat group155% tie · 3 values
55% of the population shares a single value across only 3 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique10med29th pct
29th percentile · 71% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique9med
Detection coverage C0035
686 distinct rules cover the 20 techniques recorded for this campaign. The 709 technique-to-rule mappings resolve to 686 distinct rules, because one rule can cover several techniques. 437 Sigma · 249 Splunk.
17 covered by at least one rule3 with no coverage686 distinct rules in total
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