C0026 was a campaign identified in September 2022 that included the selective distribution of KOPILUWAK and QUIETCANARY malware to previous ANDROMEDA malware victims in Ukraine through re-registered ANDROMEDA C2 domains. Several tools and tactics used during C0026 were consistent with historic Turla operations.[1]
6
TechniquesBottom 13%
4
TacticsBottom 16%
6
Tools & malwareTop 12%
0
Threat groupsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
During C0026, the threat actors used WinRAR to collect documents on targeted systems. The threat actors appeared to only exfiltrate files created after January 1, 2021.5
For C0026, the threat actors re-registered expired C2 domains previously used for ANDROMEDA malware.7
Resource Developmentno detection rules
Standing C0026
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this campaign touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 56 ATT&CK campaigns only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques6Bottom 13%
13th percentile · 87% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics4Bottom 16%
16th percentile · 84% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more tactics spanned.
Tools & malware6Top 12%
88th percentile · 88% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have this many tools and malware or fewer.
Threat groups055% tie · 3 values
55% of the population shares a single value across only 3 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique13.5med55th pct
55th percentile · 55% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have this many detection rules per technique or fewer.
Tests / technique2.5med48th pct
48th percentile · 52% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more atomic tests per technique.
Data comps / technique4med43% tie · 7 values
43% of the population shares a single value across only 7 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Mitigations / technique1med38th pct
38th percentile · 62% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more mitigations per technique.
6 of 8 axes carry an honest rank on this page. Coverage medians are taken across this campaign’s 6 Enterprise techniques.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
Detects the Linux-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency by Axios NPM package, including payload download via curl and detached execution using nohup and python3. (...)
Detects the macOS-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency in Axios NPM Package, including AppleScript execution via osascript, payload download, permission modification, execution, and cleanup.
This analytic detects unexpected outbound network connections initiated by known webserver processes such as `httpd.exe`, `nginx.exe`, or `tomcat.exe` to common file sharing or public content hosting services like GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin. (...)
The following analytic detects potential reverse shell activity by identifying connections involving ports commonly associated with remote access tools, shell listeners, or tunneling utilities. (...)
The following analytic detects connections with a high Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) threat confidence score, indicating potentially malicious behavior within encrypted traffic. (...)
This analytic identifies Snort intrusion signatures that have been triggered by ten or more distinct internal IP addresses within a one-hour window. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of the curl utility where the command line includes percent-encoded characters and explicit file output options (such as -o or --output). (...)
An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.